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CIVIL RIGHTS CATCH-22S
Jonathan P. Feingold†

Civil rights advocates have long viewed litigation as a vital path to social
change. In many ways, it is. But in key respects that remain underexplored in legal
scholarship, even successful litigation can hinder remedial projects. This perverse
effect stems from civil rights doctrines that incentivize litigants (or their attorneys)
to foreground community plight—such as academic underachievement or
overincarceration. Rational plaintiffs, responding in kind, deploy legal narratives
that tend to track racial stereotypes and regressive theories of inequality. When this
occurs, even successful lawsuits can harden the structural and behavioral forces that
produce and perpetuate racial inequality.
I refer to this dynamic as a “civil rights catch-22.” To concretize this
phenomenon and its effects, I explore recent right-to-education lawsuits featuring
low-income students of color. The cases reveal how doctrine can drive plaintiffs to
portray themselves and their communities through a lens of poverty and illiteracy.
Even if strategic from a litigation perspective, the proliferation of such narratives
can entrench disparities across educational domains.
For decades, critical race theorists have revealed how the law “constructs” race.
This Article builds on that canon but shifts the lens to litigation itself. For those
committed to meaningful racial reform, better understanding this dynamic is
essential—particularly given the emancipatory role that civil rights litigation is
understood to fulfill.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2020, self-identified African-American and Latino students
from some of Detroit’s worst public schools obtained a landmark
settlement in Gary B. v. Whitmer.1 The outcome warranted celebration.
1 See Press Release, The Off. of Governor Gretchen Whitmer, Governor Whitmer and
Plaintiffs Announce Settlement in Landmark Gary B. Literacy Case (May 14, 2020) [hereinafter
Whitmer Press Release], https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/news/press-releases/2020/05/14/
governor-whitmer-and-plaintiffs-announce-settlement-in-landmark-gary-b—literacy-case
[https://perma.cc/PM9E-GDWV]; Class Action Complaint at 17–20, Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F.
Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d
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For school-financing litigants, wins have been elusive since the Supreme
Court rejected a constitutional right to education half a century ago.2
One would be forgiven, therefore, for lauding Gary B. as a long-awaited
pathway to equality for the students, their community, and education
advocates beyond.
In this Article, I caution against such a unitary reading. On the one
hand, Gary B. was a historic win. Following decades of disinvestment
and mismanagement of Detroit’s public schools,3 the students deserved
nothing less than a full vindication of their right to education. At the
same time, Gary B. and lawsuits like it pose an often-unseen threat to
near- and long-term projects of racial justice.4 School-financing
lawsuits—even when they succeed—can calcify behavioral and
structural forces that drive inequality across educational domains.
This perverse outcome results from what I term a “civil rights
catch-22,” which proceeds as follows.5 First, certain civil rights
doctrines incentivize, if not require, plaintiffs to foreground individual
or group-based deficits.6 Rational plaintiffs and their attorneys respond
616 (6th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted mem., 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (No. 16-CV13292). The settlement provided, inter alia, $280,000 for the named plaintiffs, $2.72 million for
Detroit public schools, and a commitment to seek at least $94.4 million for literacy-related
programs and initiatives. Whitmer Press Release, supra. Prior to the settlement, a Sixth Circuit
panel had revived the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment adequacy claims. See Gary B., 957 F.3d
at 621.
2 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee a general right to education). In this Article, to
manage scope, I focus on federal adequacy challenges. Litigants have enjoyed greater, albeit
mixed, success bringing similar claims arising under state constitutions. See Erika K. Wilson,
Blurred Lines: Public School Reforms and the Privatization of Public Education, 51 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 189, 192 (2016).
3 See JOHN GROVER & YVETTE VAN DER VELDE, LOVELAND TECHS., A SCHOOL DISTRICT IN
CRISIS: DETROIT’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1842–2015 (2016).
4 The civil rights catch-22 I describe herein is distinct from, yet related to, other concerns
presented by civil rights litigation. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976)
(describing litigation tensions).
5 There is, arguably, a second layer to the civil rights catch-22. The first layer, and my focus
herein, concerns how certain legal doctrines incentivize plaintiffs to emphasize community
deficits. But legal doctrine is also responsible, in part, for many of the conditions that produced
and continue to perpetuate pervasive racial disparities. Gary B. is illustrative. School-financing
doctrine incentivized the plaintiffs to deploy a narrative of poverty and illiteracy. But schoolfinancing doctrine, among other sociolegal forces, also facilitated the decades of public and
private disinvestment and mismanagement that relegated a racialized community to a crumbling
and underresourced educational environment.
6 In this Article, for purposes of scope, I focus on federal school-financing doctrine. See infra
Part III. That said, it is worth noting that multiple other bodies of law reward litigants for
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in kind—often through statistics and anecdotes that highlight
community underachievement, vulnerability, and plight.7 In effect,
plaintiffs craft legal stories that tend to track—and thereby activate and
reinforce—pernicious racial stereotypes and dominant narratives about
racial inequality.8 In other words, the very narratives that anchor and
propel civil rights lawsuits can threaten near- and long-term projects of
antiracist reform.9
Gary B. offers an illustrative example. Among other claims, the
Gary B. plaintiffs argued that Michigan had violated their constitutional
right to education.10 To prevail, the plaintiffs had to prove that they were
deprived of a “minimally adequate education.”11 Cognizant of this high
burden,12 the Detroit students alleged that their state had denied them
access to “foundational literacy”—that is, the basic ability to read and
write.13 To amplify this core theory, the plaintiffs marshalled a litany of
employing deficit frames. Two notable examples include asylum claims and right-to-counsel
claims. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES & INT’L DET. COAL., IDENTIFYING AND
ADDRESSING VULNERABILITY: A TOOL FOR ASYLUM AND MIGRATION SYSTEMS (2016) (asylum
claims); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30 (1981) (right-to-counsel claim).
7 This Article surfaces an ongoing debate about the proper role of civil rights attorneys visà-vis their clients. This debate includes questions about who is empowered to frame legal
narratives. See generally GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992). Although beyond the scope of this Article, such dynamics
deserve mention—particularly given the race and class divides that often separate civil rights
attorneys from the communities they serve.
8 See infra Part II. Several articles have noted that evidence of racial inequality can produce
perverse effects. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Equal Protection and White Supremacy, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
1457, 1463 (2018) (“One study reveals that if white people are cued that a particular policy has a
disparate impact on black people, it makes white support for the policy go up.”); Jack Glaser,
Karin D. Martin & Kimberly B. Kahn, Possibility of Death Sentence Has Divergent Effect on
Verdicts for Black and White Defendants, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539, 541 (2015) (“In another
study, arguments that the death penalty discriminates against Blacks actually increased support
for the death penalty among Whites.” (emphasis omitted)); Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black
Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1510 (2016) (“Hetey
and . . . Eberhardt have demonstrated that individuals who viewed images or heard information
about a prison population with a higher proportion of blacks in it were subsequently more afraid
of crime, which in turn predicted greater support for more aggressive law enforcement
practices.”). This is the first Article, however, that bridges the social science to civil rights
litigation itself.
9 See infra Part II; see also Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in
Incarceration Increase Acceptance of Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1949 (2014) (observing that
white support for punitive policies increased after exposure to more severe racial disparities).
10 See Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 628 (6th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted mem.,
958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
11 Id. at 644 (first quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986); and then citing San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973)); see also infra Section III.B.1.
12 No plaintiff before the Supreme Court has met this burden. See infra Section III.A.
13 See Gary B., 957 F.3d at 620–21.
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statistics documenting their community’s academic impoverishment
and underachievement—in absolute terms and relative to whiter and
wealthier communities.14
The plaintiffs, in short, framed themselves and their community
through a narrative of poverty and illiteracy. This portrayal reflects
what others have termed a “deficit frame”—that is, storytelling that
foregrounds and emphasizes what a group lacks (or is perceived to
lack).15 Often, as in Gary B., deficit frames track salient racial
stereotypes and related narratives about racial inequality.
Given doctrinal demands, presenting an image of poor and
uneducated Black and brown students makes sense. But deficit framing
is not attributable to legal burdens alone. The narrative that travels
through Gary B. also reflects a trend among many on the Left to
discursively center racial inequality and racialized vulnerabilities.16 This
push arises, in part, from the common instinct that “bombarding the
public with images and statistics documenting the plight of minorities
will motivate people to fight inequality.”17
Yet herein surfaces the danger—that is, the catch of our catch-22.18
Rather than galvanize support for remedial policies, deficit framing
risks doing just the opposite.19 As social psychologists Rebecca Hetey
and Jennifer Eberhardt recently explained, “[E]xposure to extreme
racial disparities may make the public less, not more, responsive to
attempts to lessen the severity of policies that help maintain those
disparities—even when people agree that such policies are too
See id. at 661.
See ALEXIS MCGILL JOHNSON & RACHEL GODSIL, EXECS.’ ALL. FOR BOYS & MEN OF COLOR,
HIS STORY: SHIFTING NARRATIVES FOR BOYS AND MEN OF COLOR 24 (2018),
https://perception.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/HisStory-Narrative-Toolkit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32EM-9T5K] (defining “[d]eficit frames” as narratives that “highlight racial
disparities and gaps . . . that impact life outcomes such as education and health”).
16 See Naomi Murakawa, Racial Innocence: Law, Social Science, and the Unknowing of Racism
in the US Carceral State, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 473, 477 (2019) (“Critics of the carceral state
marshal racial disparity statistics as a persuasive tactic, but research from social psychologists
suggests that the invocation of extreme racial disparity might diminish white support for
reform.”).
17 Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 9, at 1952; see also JOHNSON & GODSIL, supra note 15, at 24
(identifying a widespread assumption that more information about racial inequality “will trigger
moral urgency to change the conditions that contribute to those disparities”).
18 I use the term “catch-22” as a loose metaphor that strays, admittedly, from Joseph Heller’s
use of the term in the novel Catch-22.
19 See infra Part II; see also Allison L. Skinner-Dorkenoo et al., Highlighting COVID-19 Racial
Disparities Can Reduce Support for Safety Precautions Among White U.S. Residents, 301 SOC. SCI.
& MED. 1 (2022) (finding that as individuals learned more about Covid-19’s racially disparate
impact, they became less fearful of Covid-19 and less supportive of safety precautions to prevent
spread).
14
15
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punitive.”20 In other words, rather than pave a road to antiracist reform,
deficit frames can calcify the conditions that drive disparities and
necessitate litigation in the first place.21
The concept of a civil rights catch-22 builds on scholarship that
implicates civil rights litigation within broader processes of racial
formation.22 For decades, critical race theorists have illuminated the coconstitutive relationship between law and race; each is responsible, in
part, for constructing the other.23 Existing scholarship often identifies
Supreme Court jurisprudence and positive law as the primary vehicles
through which the law “constructs” race.24 Here, I turn the lens to civil
rights litigation and the narratives deployed therein.25 Doing so
illuminates an underexamined and underappreciated litigation risk: the
potential for litigants to employ narratives that reinforce racial biases
and related theories of inequality—and, thereby, legitimate and fortify
the status quo litigants seek to change.26

20 Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 9, at 1952; see also Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L.
Eberhardt, The Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves: Racial Disparities and the Persistence of
Inequality in the Criminal Justice System, 27 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 183, 183 (2018)
[hereinafter Hetey & Eberhardt, Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves] (“Ironically, exposure to
extreme disparities can cause people to become more, not less, supportive of the very policies
that create those disparities.”); Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, Persuasion and Resistance: Race and
the Death Penalty in America, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 996, 1001 (2007) (observing that white support
for the death penalty increases after learning that it discriminates against Blacks). The above
studies, which I explore in Part II, involved criminal justice policies. For multiple reasons, the
observed backlash is unlikely to be limited to this singular domain. See infra Section II.B
(discussing how deficit frames can activate and reinforce pernicious presumptions of Black and
brown intellectual inferiority in the domain of education).
21 See infra Section II.B.
22 See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994).
23 See David Simson, Comment, Exclusion, Punishment, Racism and Our Schools: A Critical
Race Theory Perspective on School Discipline, 61 UCLA L. REV. 506, 527 n.100 (2014) (“A
corollary of the idea of law as both a social and a legal construction is that the relationship
between law and race is not unidirectional but rather coconstitutive.”); Laura E. Gómez,
Understanding Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive: An Invitation to Explore an Emerging
Field, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 487, 488 (2010) (identifying “an emerging genre of sociolegal
scholarship that explores how law and race construct each other in an ongoing, dialectic process
that ultimately reproduces and transforms racial inequality”).
24 See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev. ed.
2006).
25 This is not to suggest that Supreme Court jurisprudence is irrelevant to the civil rights
catch-22 I explore herein. To the contrary, legal doctrine enables and entrenches inequitable
conditions on the ground and shapes how litigants talk about that racial inequality. See infra
Sections III.A–III.B.
26 See infra Part II.
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In Part I, to lay an analytical and empirical foundation, I introduce
the concept of framing and explore alternative ways litigants could
frame racial inequality—what I term “racial inequality frames.” In Part
II, I draw on emerging social science that suggests frames that
emphasize perceived minority deficits can stifle projects of racial
reform. In Part III, to concretize the catch-22, I bridge the social science
to recent school-financing litigation. These cases illustrate how legal
doctrine can incentivize plaintiffs to employ deficit frames and related
narratives that track and reinforce anti-Black biases. In Part IV, to chart
a path forward, I explore how plaintiffs might mitigate the dangers
deficit frames present. To do so, I explore how litigants in a recent rightto-education lawsuit flipped a common script by juxtaposing student
assets against institutional deficiencies.
Before proceeding, two points deserve emphasis. First, I am not
suggesting that deficit frames and their concomitant risks counsel
against civil rights litigation. Stakeholders on the ground are far better
positioned to identify potent sites of resistance to racialized power and
hierarchy. At times, that resistance will include litigation. Nonetheless,
litigants, their attorneys, and their allies should recognize that wellintended and legally strategic narratives can bear unintended
consequences.
Second, I am not advocating for a “colorblind” or “post-racial”
discourse that elides the stratifying and subordinating power of race,
racism, and racial power. Avoiding racism and its centrality within
American society is unlikely to lessen its force or facilitate its undoing.
Moreover, the question is not whether to talk about race and racial
inequality. Rather, the question is how to do so. Deficit frames comprise
one form of racial discourse. My call, accordingly, is to mind the social
science and employ communication practices best positioned to disrupt
dominant racial narratives and galvanize support for antiracist reform.
I. FRAMING INEQUALITY
A.

Framing Basics

Plaintiffs are storytellers.27 Effective storytelling requires
thoughtful framing—a concept that captures how a speaker

27 As noted above, a critical question that transcends the scope of this Article is whether the
lawyer-client relationship empowers plaintiffs to craft the narratives deployed in litigation meant
to vindicate their rights. See supra note 7.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3997957

FEINGOLD.43.5.2 (Do Not Delete)

1862

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

6/30/22 1:14 PM

[Vol. 43:5

communicates, organizes, and packages information.28 Framing can be
understood as a process of selection and salience.29 Selection concerns
the facts, values, and metaphors a communicator highlights and
foregrounds—as well as those minimized or left unsaid.30 Selection
leads to salience. Once highlighted, a “piece of information [becomes]
more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable.”31 As a result, alternative
frames can “radically” alter how an audience perceives “[t]he character,
causes, and consequences of” a given subject, policy, or phenomenon.32
One can disaggregate framing into choices that concern (a) the
presentation of facts and (b) the use of narrative. Here, I refer to these
framing elements as fact framing and narrative framing.33
28 There is an ongoing debate regarding framing’s proper definition and scope. See Michael
A. Cacciatore, Dietram A. Scheufele & Shanto Iyengar, The End of Framing as We Know
It . . . and the Future of Media Effects, 19 MASS COMMC’N & SOC’Y 7, 8 (2016) (“The
communication literature is rife with different conceptualizations of frames and framing.”);
Thomas J. Leeper & Rune Slothuus, How the News Media Persuades: Framing Effects and Beyond,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL PERSUASION 151, 153 (Elizabeth Suhay, Bernard
Grofman & Alexander H. Trechsel eds., 2020) (“At the core of debates about media effects lies
one of the most important, but most confused, concepts in the social sciences: framing. This
concept is used in different ways across disciplines, and recent scholars have gone so far as to
argue that the concept should be abandoned as its meaning is lost in a confusion of alternative
definition.” (citations omitted)). For purposes of this Article, my use of the term follows Nat
Kendall-Taylor and Sean Gibbons, who describe framing as “what we choose to say and how we
choose to say it.” Nat Kendall-Taylor & Sean Gibbons, Framing for Social Change, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/framing_for_social_change
[https://perma.cc/RC8U-Y5R9].
29 See MOIRA O’NEIL, ADAM SIMON, ABIGAIL HAYDON & NAT KENDALL-TAYLOR,
FRAMEWORKS INST., THE MEDIA NARRATIVE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 9 (2012),
https://www.frameworksinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Media_Narratives_
Environmental_Health.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF7D-4XSB] (“Framing deals with the
presentation and selection of perceptual cues that make stories meaningful . . . .” (emphasis
omitted)); Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J.
COMMC’N 51, 54 (1993) (“[F]rames select and call attention to particular aspects of the reality
described, which logically means that frames simultaneously direct attention away from other
aspects.”).
30 See Entman, supra note 29, at 52.
31 Id. at 53; see also PAUL M. SNIDERMAN, RICHARD A. BRODY & PHILIP E. TETLOCK,
REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 52 (1st paperback ed. 1993)
(“The effect of framing is to prime values differentially, establishing the salience of the one or the
other.”).
32 Murray Edelman, Contestable Categories and Public Opinion, 10 POL. COMMC’N 231, 232
(1993); see also Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee A. Clawson & Zoe M. Oxley, Media Framing of a Civil
Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 567–68 (1997) (“By
framing social and political issues in specific ways, news organizations declare the underlying
causes and likely consequences of a problem and establish criteria for evaluating potential
remedies for the problem.”).
33 This description is not exhaustive. See Kendall-Taylor & Gibbons, supra note 28 (“Frames
[also] include other elements, such as tone, numbers and statistics, solutions, and visuals.”).
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Fact framing, as I use the term, captures whether and how a
communicator presents information about a topic.34 Imagine a reporter
tasked with a story on teenagers and truancy. The reporter might choose
to include attendance statistics. This decision does not dictate how she
presents the data. The reporter could present daily attendance in the
affirmative (e.g., eighty-five percent present) or the negative (e.g.,
fifteen percent absent). The options depict the same empirical reality,
but each employs a distinct valence. The negative valence highlights
truancy; the positive valence highlights attendance.
Even if seemingly minor, these subtle shifts matter.35 Attributes
presented through a positive valence (e.g., eighty-five percent
attendance) tend to elicit a more favorable evaluation than those
presented through a negative valence (e.g., fifteen percent absence).36 A
set of studies involving athletic and academic performance is
illustrative.37 In both studies, participants received information about
an athlete’s or student’s prior performance.38 Participants in the positive
condition were told the percentage of shots made or questions answered
correctly.39 Participants in the negative condition were told the
percentage of shots missed or questions answered incorrectly.40
The framing choices mattered. Participants in the positive
conditions rated the prior academic and basketball performance more

34 I intend for fact framing to include attribute-framing effects. See Irwin P. Levin, Gary J.
Gaeth, Judy Schreiber & Marco Lauriola, A New Look at Framing Effects: Distribution of Effect
Sizes, Individual Differences, and Independence of Types of Effects, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 411, 412–13 (2002).
35 See id. at 416–28 (presenting research on attribute-framing effects).
36 The magnitude of any framing effect depends on the salience of the manipulation—a
function of, inter alia, attribute labels (e.g., “percentage-lean” versus “percentage-fat”) and
“peoples’ existing representations of [the chosen] attribute labels.” David J. Hardisty, Eric J.
Johnson & Elke U. Weber, A Dirty Word or a Dirty World? Attribute Framing, Political
Affiliation, and Query Theory, 21 PSYCH. SCI. 86, 86, 91 (2010) (“Attribute framing has been a
well-established phenomenon in policy discourse and a frequently exploited one in political
practice.”); see also Irwin P. Levin, Sandra L. Schneider & Gary J. Gaeth, All Frames Are Not
Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 149, 160–64 (1998).
37 Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, supra note 36, at 159 (describing attribute-framing study
involving athletic performance); Irwin P. Levin, Richard D. Johnson, Craig P. Russo & Patricia J.
Deldin, Framing Effects in Judgment Tasks with Varying Amounts of Information, 36
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 362, 370–71 (1985) (describing studentevaluation study).
38 Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, supra note 36, at 159; Levin, Johnson, Russo & Deldin, supra
note 37, at 366.
39 See sources cited supra note 38.
40 See sources cited supra note 38.
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favorably than did those in the negative conditions.41 To explain these
effects, the studies’ coauthors theorized that “positive labels tend to
evoke positive associations while negative labels tend to evoke negative
associations.”42
Narrative framing, in contrast, captures a communicator’s use of
narratives to describe a given issue or topic.43 Narratives comprise
generalizable and recognizable stories that explain and rationalize the
world around us.44 Through repeated use, certain narratives attain
dominance within our cultural fabric and public discourse.45 These
dominant narratives, in turn, propagate and calcify “meanings about
social issues [that] circulate and become part of the public’s everyday
and dominant understandings of those issues.”46 Once a narrative
becomes ingrained within public discourse—that is, once it becomes
dominant—it functions as a conceptual filter that influences how the
public perceives and interprets related topics or phenomena. Dominant
narratives, in short, are often unseen and yet affect “how [people]
understand the world around them.”47
Psychological anthropologist Nat Kendall-Taylor describes this
phenomenon with respect to adolescence:
[I]f we are exposed over and over again to messages replete with the
idea that adolescents are dangerous risk takers who must be
protected from themselves, we develop deep and solid associations
between “young people” and “risk and danger.” Over time and with

See sources cited supra note 37.
Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber & Lauriola, supra note 34, at 413.
43 Narrative framing can occur through word choices that activate distinct social narratives.
See Hardisty, Johnson & Weber, supra note 36, at 87–88 (observing different reactions to the
same policy described as a “tax” or “carbon offset”); Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, supra note 32, at
570–74 (observing different reactions to the same event described through a “public order” or
“free speech” frame).
44 There exist “rich and varied literatures on narrative, complete with controversies
surrounding definitions and analytic approaches.” O’NEIL, SIMON, HAYDON & KENDALLTAYLOR, supra note 29, at 9–10 (describing narrative as a communicative form that “makes
information meaningful through recognizable, continually reiterated, and culturally specific
representational forms”). For present purposes, I draw on Professors Lewis and Sandra
Hinchman, who define “narratives (stories) . . . as discourses with a clear sequential order that
connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience, and thus offer insights about the
world and/or people’s experiences of it.” Lewis P. Hinchman & Sandra K. Hinchman,
Introduction to MEMORY, IDENTITY, COMMUNITY: THE IDEA OF NARRATIVE IN THE HUMAN
SCIENCES, at xiii, xvi (Lewis P. Hinchman & Sandra K. Hinchman eds., 2001).
45 See O’NEIL, SIMON, HAYDON & KENDALL-TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 10.
46 Id.; see also JOHNSON & GODSIL, supra note 15, at 11 (“Dominant narratives inform how a
majority of people in society perceive and interact with one another.”).
47 O’NEIL, SIMON, HAYDON & KENDALL-TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 10.
41
42
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repetition, these associations strengthen to the point that when we
see or hear about an adolescent, we feel uncomfortable or
threatened.48

We can return to our hypothetical reporter. In the United States,
we often view adolescence through a negative frame that portrays
“young people as dangerous threats and adolescence as an unfortunate
time of life.”49 Given its dominance, this narrative is positioned to shape
how readers interpret and respond to the reporter’s story even if the
narrative is not explicitly invoked. The reporter is not, however,
beholden to this narrative. She could, for example, embrace a more
positive frame that characterizes youth as “a time of opportunity when
lifelong skills and relationships are built and passions spark and
ignite.”50
These choices matter. As Kendall-Taylor explains, the narratives
we employ inform “how we see and think about young people,” and,
accordingly, “how we as a society choose to support them and their
development.”51 When negative frames dominate, we are more likely to
attribute adolescence as the cause of teens’ behavior and identify
paternalistic interventions as a sensible response.52 If, instead, we view
adolescence and teenagers through a prism of not-yet-realized
opportunity and potential, we may instead see “[s]caffolded support,
agency, and empowerment” as key ingredients to a healthy and
productive youth.53 Moreover, rather than viewing teenagers as a
problem to be fixed, we might instead ask how we can design
institutions to best support them.54 In short, the way we portray
adolescence influences how “we understand and choose to support
young people.”55
These lessons translate to other settings—including conversations
about race and racial inequality. To illuminate how, I now turn to the
focus of this Article: racial inequality frames.

48 Nat Kendall-Taylor, Commentary, Shifting the Frame to Change How We See Young
People, 66 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 137, 138 (2020).
49 Id. at 137.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Cf. Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, supra note 32, at 568 (“Poverty, for example, may be framed
in a way that emphasizes the responsibility of the poor themselves for their disadvantaged status
or in a way that suggests social, economic, or political forces are to blame.”).
53 Kendall-Taylor, supra note 48, at 137.
54 See id. at 137–38.
55 Id. at 138.
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Competing Racial Inequality Frames

Many on the front lines of racial justice feel a palpable urgency to
foreground race and racial inequality within public discourse.56 This
desire is understandable and holds strategic appeal.
To begin, it counters appeals to “post-racialism” and
“colorblindness,” racial ideologies that enjoy cultural and doctrinal
prominence.57 Colorblindness and post-racialism reduce race to an
otherwise irrelevant physical attribute and relegate racism (for the most
part) to an ignoble past.58 In so doing, these racial frames invite the
conclusion that contemporary inequities are due to minority deficits
(e.g., cultural pathologies) or the aberrant bad actor (e.g., “bad apple”
cops). In other words, post-racialism and colorblindness comprise
racial frames that legitimate the status quo.
Recent calls to foreground race and racism within public discourse,
in turn, represent a response to these narratives. But beyond countering
the logics of post-racialism and colorblindness, many advocates believe
that increasing public awareness of racial inequality is a prerequisite to
antiracist reform. Consider the following hypothetical.
Imagine a coalition of law students and community stakeholders
want to repeal a state law responsible for heightened incarceration rates
in their state. Further assume that the law has disproportionately
impacted Black and Latinx communities. How should the coalition
proceed? Conventional wisdom might call for a public-awareness
campaign that draws attention to accelerating incarceration rates and
their disparate impact.59
56 See Eric Deggans, Four Lessons from the Media’s Conflicted Coverage of Race, NPR CODE
SWITCH (Dec. 6, 2014, 11:38 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/12/06/
368713550/four-lessons-from-the-medias-conflicted-coverage-of-race [https://perma.cc/52BY8NUV]; Victor Rogers, Can We Talk About Race—and Racism? Yes., GA. TECH NEWS CTR. (June
30, 2020), https://news.gatech.edu/news/2020/06/30/ca-we-talk-about-race-and-racism-yes
[https://perma.cc/9BVP-H9WV]. For a nuanced perspective critical of the Trump
administration’s use of deficit frames, see Sean Collins, The Trump Administration Blames Covid19 Black Mortality Rates on Poor Health. It Should Blame Its Policies., VOX (Apr. 8, 2020, 4:26
PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/4/8/21213383/coronavirus-blackamericans-trump-administration-high-covid-19-death-rate [https://perma.cc/8WJU-8VGW].
57 See Yuvraj Joshi, Racial Indirection, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2495, 2509 (2019) (describing
colorblindness and post-racialism as “two leading accounts of race in constitutional cases”).
58 See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1599 (2009) (describing
colorblindness and post-racialism).
59 This tracks common criminal justice campaigns. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Fact Sheet,
NAACP, https://naacp.org/resources/criminal-justice-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/2WYR6W6L]; SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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The thinking proceeds as follows: First, without exposing racial
disparities, we lack critical information about the law’s impact
necessary to devise effective remedies.60 Second, many assume that if
only (white) voters knew about a policy’s racially disparate impact, they
would realize its unfairness and support reform.
Makes sense? Not so fast. As noted above, emerging research
suggests that rather than motivate public support for reform
(particularly among whites), exposure to extreme racial disparities can
entrench support for the policies that drive inequality.61 The social
science, in short, cautions that well-intended racial discourse can trigger
backlash that calcifies and obscures the forces that drive disparities.
For many, the risk of backlash begs the following question: If
exposure to evidence of racial inequality can harden support for
regressive policies, do we strike racial disparities from our public
discourse?62 For multiple reasons, the answer is a resounding no. To
begin, erasing race and racism from our national conversations
reproduces many of the problems inherent in colorblindness and postracialism. Moreover, as I detail below, the question is not whether to
discuss racial inequality, but rather how to discuss racial inequality.63 To

SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 9 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/
publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities [https://perma.cc/WB7K-JUUQ] (“In 2010, 8% of
all adults in the United States had a felony conviction on their record. Among African-American
men, the rate was one in three (33%).” (footnote omitted)).
60 Cf. Alejandra Vasquez, The Urgency of Intersectionality: Kimberlé Crenshaw Speaks at
TEDWomen 2016, TED BLOG (Oct. 27, 2016, 5:52 PM), https://blog.ted.com/the-urgency-ofintersectionality-kimberle-crenshaw-speaks-at-tedwomen-2016
[https://perma.cc/M537RZAX] (“When you can’t see a problem, you can’t solve it.” (quoting Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Address at TEDWomen 2016 (Oct. 27, 2016))).
61 See infra Section II.A.
62 See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993,
997 (2010) (reviewing PAUL BUTLER, A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009)) (“If the goal is to
persuade Americans to care about mass incarceration, does it make sense to frame arguments
around how the policy harms racial minorities?”).
63 Even when we focus on this latter question of how, the answer will often depend on the
reason(s) why a speaker is discussing racial inequality and the audience(s) to whom they are
speaking. Moreover, discussions of racial inequality will often benefit from intersectional frames
that highlight the relationship between racism, sexism, and homophobia, among other axes of
oppression. See Jonathan P. Feingold, “All (Poor) Lives Matter”: How Class-Not-Race Logic
Reinscribes Race and Class Privilege, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE, Oct. 30, 2020, at *47; Devon W.
Carbado & Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scrutiny: Beyond
“Either/Or” Approaches to Equal Protection, 129 YALE L.J.F. 108 (2019).
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reframe, one question confronting racial justice advocates is: How
should we frame racial inequality?64
To guide this inquiry, I offer a provisional framework to
conceptualize competing racial inequality frames (racial frames). This
framework—depicted in the graphic below—distinguishes between
racial frames as a function of their respective: (1) valence and (2) causal
theory of inequality.65 I focus on these framing elements for two
principal reasons. First, frames falling in our bottom left quadrant—
that is, frames with a negative valence and internal theories of
inequality—are most likely to stifle progressive racial reform. Second,
leading voices on the Right and the Left often employ frames with these
precise elements.

64 As noted in the preceding footnote, whether a particular frame is appropriate in a given
context turns, in part, on the speaker’s goal(s) and the audience(s) to whom they speak. For this
reason, I am not suggesting that there exists a singular, best way to discuss race, racism, and racial
inequality. As with most things, context matters. That said, a more nuanced understanding of
racial frames—and the respective costs and benefits of competing frames—can only further
movement for racial justice.
65 This framework is not without limits. A more comprehensive framework would, for
example, benefit from a third axis that considers competing theories of discrimination (e.g.,
structural versus individual). One factor that mitigates this omission is the significant overlap
between causal theories of inequality and competing theories of discrimination. See Carbado,
supra note 8, at 1485, 1508–10.
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The vertical axis, titled “Valence,” captures whether a racial frame
presents a group in a negative or positive light. On one end of the
spectrum (visually, the bottom) lie “deficit frames”—that is, narratives
that emphasize a group’s perceived shortcomings, vulnerabilities, or
plight. On the other end of the spectrum (visually, the top) lie “asset
frames.” As the name suggests, asset frames emphasize positive
attributes—such as a group’s resilience, achievements, or potential.
Deficit frames and asset frames risk flattening a group’s
heterogeneity, dynamism, and complexity; the flattening just occurs in
opposing directions. In practice, deficit frames are far more common
within public discourse.66 One might expect this from the Right, which
has mobilized at-times-violent rhetoric that reduces communities of

66 See JOHNSON & GODSIL, supra note 15, at 24 (“Thus far, the dominant narrative about boys
and men of color has utilized a deficit frame. The stories we hear are consistently about their
inadequacies, underachievement, and plight.”); see also AXEL AUBRUN, MICHELE EMANATIAN &
JOSEPH GRADY, FRAMEWORKS INST., SIX HARMFUL PATTERNS IN NEWSPAPER PRESENTATIONS OF
RACE 5 (2005), https://www.frameworksinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/cognitive_
media_analysis-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U64G-DA44] (“The ‘problems orientation’ of Minority
coverage, i.e. the relentless focus on dysfunction (crime, unemployment, poverty, etc.), distances
Whites from Minority concerns and negatively impacts Minorities themselves. Even positive
articles, especially about African-Americans, focus on hardships overcome.”).
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color to racialized caricatures.67 But the Right is far from alone. The
mainstream media, for example, has long portrayed racial minorities
through distorted, demeaning, and dehumanizing imagery.68 A recent
apology from The Kansas City Star is illustrative: “Reporters were
frequently sickened by what they found—decades of coverage that
depicted Black Kansas Citians as criminals living in a crime-laden
world. They felt shame at what was missing: the achievements,
aspirations and milestones of an entire population routinely
overlooked, as if Black people were invisible.”69
Deficit frames also pervade academia. “Mismatch theory” offers a
conspicuous example. The theory posits that race-conscious university
admissions harm Black students by placing them at institutions above
their academic pedigree.70 One could characterize mismatch as a double
deficit frame; the theory deploys empirical “evidence”71 of racial
achievement gaps to buttress an explicit narrative of Black intellectual
inferiority.72
Mismatch theory has enjoyed notable traction within legal and lay
discourse.73 This traction derives, in part, from mismatch’s convergence
with dominant narratives that attribute racial achievement gaps to

67 President Trump, for example, routinely disparaged communities of color. See Nicquel
Terry Ellis, “Stand Back and Stand By”: Rhetoric Some Call Racist Has Marked Trump’s Entire
Presidency, USA TODAY (Oct. 13, 2020, 3:46 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/elections/2020/10/13/hate-speech-common-theme-trumps-presidency/5873238002
[https://perma.cc/S5VR-BZ7Q].
68 Media outlets have begun to publicly account for this behavior. See, e.g., Editorial, An
Examination of The Times’ Failures on Race, Our Apology and a Path Forward, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
27, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-09-27/los-angeles-timesapology-racism [https://perma.cc/D7VW-KG3P].
69 Mike Fannin, The Truth in Black and White: An Apology from The Kansas City Star, KAN.
CITY STAR (Dec. 22, 2020, 3:50 PM), https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/
article247928045.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2022).
70 See Devon W. Carbado, Kate M. Turetsky & Valerie Purdie-Vaughns, Privileged or
Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position of African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 174, 176–77 (2016) (outlining mismatch theory).
71 Mismatch and its proponents have encountered sustained critique for decades. For a recent
rebuke, see Sherod Thaxton, How Not to Lie About Affirmative Action, 67 UCLA L. REV. 834
(2020).
72 See Carbado, Turetsky & Purdie-Vaughns, supra note 70, at 177.
73 See Jonathan P. Feingold & Evelyn R. Carter, Online Essay, Eyes Wide Open: What Social
Science Can Tell Us About the Supreme Court’s Use of Social Science, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1689,
1709 (2018) (explaining that lay theories tethered to deficient-student frames “gain greater
traction in public discourse, the national media, and the Supreme Court than do countervailing
theories that explain academic achievement gaps as the product of environmental contingencies
that uniquely burden students of color—even if predicated on decades of social science”).
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minority deficits.74 Mismatch theory, in other words, “implicitly relies
on longstanding ‘reasonable doubt’ about black intellectual competence
and capacity.”75 But mismatch theory does more than benefit from
pervasive stereotypes and narratives; it also reinforces them.76 To this
end, Professor Devon Carbado and colleagues have observed that “the
theory of mismatch is another way of writing intellectual deficiency and
inability into race—and more specifically, blackness.”77 The theory, in
turn, naturalizes the association between affirmative action and
“preferential treatment,” and it masks the race and class advantages
(enjoyed by wealthy white students) that affirmative action is often
designed to combat.78
Given the foregoing, it is no surprise that mismatch theory has
received considerable critique from scholars on the Left. What might be
a surprise, therefore, is the degree to which mismatch theory shares
conceptual pillars with racial frames common to the Left.79 Consider
traditional liberal defenses of affirmative action. For decades, a core of
affirmative-action advocates has justified such policies as “racial
preferences” necessary to promote racial diversity on campus.80 This
“preference framing,” consistent with mismatch, implies that raceconscious admissions benefit less-deserving Black applicants at the

See Carbado, Turetsky & Purdie-Vaughns, supra note 70, at 177 & n.9.
Id. at 177.
76 Id. at 177 n.9 (“[Mismatch] theory helps to legitimize and further entrench a pernicious
racial stereotype about African Americans.”).
77 Id. at 177.
78 See Feingold, supra note 63, at *48–50.
79 Consider also calls for “trigger warnings” and “safe spaces,” concepts common across
equity-and-inclusion work. I am sympathetic to the concerns that drive such calls. See Jonathan
P. Feingold, Diversity Drift, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 14, 17–19 (2019). Nonetheless, this
language has the potential to cast groups outside the mainstream (racial or otherwise) as weak
and in need of institutional protection. The language, in other words, can obscure substantive
critiques of institutional culture and racial power. Cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Lead Article,
Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253,
1270–73 (2011) (discussing misrecognition of student concerns at Harvard Law School). At least
one institution has reframed “trigger warnings” as a “heads-up for better teaching” and “safe
spaces” as “[s]afe [s]paces + [b]rave [s]paces.” OFF. OF EQUITY, DIVERSITY & INCLUSION, UCLA,
FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS: THE BASICS, THE MYTHS, THE CHALLENGES 11–12 (2017),
https://ucla.app.box.com/v/free-speech-on-campus (last visited Apr. 22, 2022).
80 See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential
Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 29–33 (1994); Carbado, Turetsky & Purdie-Vaughns, supra note 70, at 188
(“Both conservatives and liberals regularly refer to affirmative action as a thumb on the scale and
both conceptualize the policy as a preference. . . . [W]hereas liberals believe that the costs of
affirmative action are outweighed by the benefits (including diversity), conservatives perceive the
costs of the policy (including ‘reverse discrimination’) to be too high.”).
74
75
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expense of their “more qualified” white counterparts. In other words,
even though the ultimate position vis-à-vis affirmative action varies,
scholars on the Left and Right often talk about affirmative action in
terms that presume minority deficits.
Similar framing elements often accompany education-reform
campaigns. Such projects, designed to uplift communities of color, tend
to moor racial performance gaps to narratives of underachievement and
plight.81 As I discuss in greater detail below,82 these frames track, and
are prone to activate and reinforce, dominant narratives of “damaged”
Black and brown students defined by their “shortcomings” and
“insurmountable” obstacles.83
Moving to the horizontal axis of our racial inequality frames, the
relevant inquiry concerns the frame’s causal theory of inequality. Causal
theories tend to fall into one of two categories: internal explanations
and external explanations.84
Internal explanations attribute disparities to individual or groupbased traits. Examples include theories that attribute Black
overincarceration to criminal predisposition, or Black academic
underperformance to cultural deviance. As these examples reflect,
internal theories tend to blame individuals and groups for the negative
outcomes they endure.
External explanations, in contrast, attribute inequality to
situational or environmental factors. Examples include theories that
attribute Black overincarceration to policies and practices that increase
Black precarity to state violence, or Black underperformance to hostile
learning environments.85

81 See JOHNSON & GODSIL, supra note 15, at 24 (“[A]dvocates for boys and men of color often
lead with disparities—such as the education ‘achievement gap’ or the over-incarceration of Black
men—as a way to call attention to a problem and galvanize others to take action. Emphasizing
negative outcomes, however, often has the unintended consequence of reinforcing the dominant
narrative . . . .”).
82 See infra Section III.C.2 (discussing potential consequences of racialized deficit frames).
83 See Luke Charles Harris, Response, Beyond the Best Black: The Making of a Critical Race
Theorist at Yale Law School, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1379, 1403 (2011) (“The focus of our concern
would shift from a story about damaged individuals to a story about damaged institutions. . . .”);
JOHNSON & GODSIL, supra note 15, at 24 (“Those who intend to support boys and men of color
are likely to not think that they are using a ‘deficit approach,’ but instead see themselves as
identifying the disparities in outcomes that they assume will trigger moral urgency to change the
conditions that contribute to those disparities.”).
84 In many respects, the internal-external divide tracks individual-structural theories of
discrimination. There are, however, meaningful distinctions. For example, individual theories of
discrimination often focus on individual perpetrators—a theory of inequality that arguably falls
closer to an external than an internal theory of inequality.
85 See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 8, at 1483–87.
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Internal and external theories of inequality travel through public
discourse. Nonetheless, internal theories of inequality tend to enjoy
outsized influence over the public’s perception of racial disparities. And
often, internal causal theories trade on perceived group-based deficits.
In other words, and as depicted below, the weight of public discourse
tends to fall into the bottom left quadrant—where deficit frames and
internal theories of inequality meet.

This convergence makes sense. Many of the racial stereotypes that
animate deficit frames also fuel internal theories of inequality.
Moreover, the overlay creates a potential feedback loop: internal
theories of inequality invite deficit frames (and vice versa), which in
turn reify the stereotypes that anchor internal theories of inequality. To
better appreciate this dynamic, I now turn to emerging social science
that surfaces the dangers of deficit framing.
II. DEFICIT FRAME DANGERS86
Deficit frames flatten the inherent depth, complexity, and
heterogeneity of any group. In the context of racial inequality, this
86 For a deeper dive into unintended consequences that can flow from deficit frames, see
Jonathan P. Feingold, Deficit Frame Dangers, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1235 (2021).
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flattening risks more than projecting an incomplete picture; it risks
projecting an incomplete picture that tracks and reifies socially salient
stereotypes. Two troubling consequences follow: (1) a backlash problem
and (2) a misdiagnosis problem. As to the former, exposure to deficit
frames can—particularly among whites—fortify support for regressive
policies that drive existing inequality. As to the latter, deficit frames can
activate and reinforce internal causal theories of inequality—theories
that, in effect, blame subordinated groups for their subordinate status.
Policy prescriptions, in turn, tend to privilege interventions designed to
fix “damaged” individuals or communities. This focus, in turn,
inoculates environmental forces—that often drive inequality—from
meaningful critique.87
A.

A Cautionary Tale: Backlash and Misdiagnosis

Racial justice campaigns often emphasize racial disparities. I
understand the appeal. Many assume that their neighbors would
support progressive reform if only they understood our laws’, practices’,
and policies’ racially disparate impacts.88
The trouble is, two recent studies from Professors Rebecca Hetey
and Jennifer Eberhardt offer a sobering tale.89 Rather than galvanize
support for reform, exposing whites “to a world with extreme racial
stratification increase[d] their support for the policies that help to
maintain that stratification.”90
In their first study, Hetey and Eberhart tested whether exposure to
racial disparities in California’s prison population would influence
support for the state’s three-strikes law.91 The study proceeded as
follows. First, participants viewed a forty-second video in which eighty
actual mug shots flashed across the screen.92 The researchers created
two conditions to portray racial disparities as more or less severe.93 In
87 Cf. Feingold & Carter, supra note 73, at 1706 (“[S]tereotypes frequently form the
substantive content that undergirds cognitive biases and heuristics and their influence on how
we see the world. . . . [J]ust as societal forces (such as media portrayals and common discourse)
determine what we ‘know’ as the prototypical fruit, societal forces also impact what we ‘know’
about the prototypical criminal, student, or surgeon.” (footnote omitted)).
88 See Hetey & Eberhardt, Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves, supra note 20, at 183.
89 Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 9.
90 Id. at 1950. Hetey and Eberhardt limited their studies to white participants. Id. at 1950–51;
see also Skinner-Dorkenoo, supra note 19.
91 Id. at 1950. Under the law, a third offense of shoplifting could result in a life sentence. Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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the “less-Black” condition, 25% of the mug shots were Black inmates.94
In the “more-Black” condition, 45% of the mug shots were Black
inmates.95
After viewing the video, participants were informed about
California’s three-strikes law and an open petition to amend it.
Participants were then asked to rate the three-strikes law on a scale of
one (not punitive enough) to seven (too punitive). Last, after the study
putatively ended, participants were invited to sign the petition.96
Under conventional wisdom, support for reform would be highest
in the more-Black condition—which exposed participants to more
extreme racial disparities.97 The opposite occurred. Whereas over half
of participants in the less-Black condition signed the petition, that
number dropped to less than 28% in the more-Black condition.98 This
effect remained regardless of views on the law’s punitiveness.99 In other
words, as the racial disparity increased, participants were less willing to
change a law even when they saw it as overly harsh.100
In a companion study, Hetey and Eberhardt explored whether
exposure to more severe racial disparities would increase New Yorkers’
support for the city’s stop-and-frisk policy.101 As in the California study,
participants received demographic information about New York’s
inmate population. In the less-Black condition, participants read that
the state’s prison population was 40.3% Black.102 In the more-Black
condition, participants read that the prison population was 60.3%
Black.103 All participants learned that a judge had recently found the
stop-and-frisk policy to be unconstitutional, and that the city was
appealing her decision.104 Participants then answered a series of
questions about the stop-and-frisk policy and crime more broadly.105

94 Id. This number approximated the percentage of Black inmates in the state’s total prison
population. Id.
95 Id. This number approximated the percentage of Black inmates incarcerated pursuant to
California’s three-strikes law. Id.
96 Id. The experimenter told each participant that if they chose to sign the petition, she would
forward their signature to California’s Attorney General to ensure it was counted. Id.
97 See id. at 1952.
98 Id. at 1950–51.
99 Id. at 1951.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. This number approximated the percentage of Black inmates in the United States. Id.
103 Id. This number corresponded to the percentage of Black inmates within New York City
correctional facilities. Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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To conclude the study, participants were informed of several
petitions to end the controversial policy. Participants were shown a
sample petition and asked the following question: “If you had been
approached by someone and asked to sign a petition like the one you
just read, would you have signed it?”106 Participants could answer “yes”
or “no,” at which point the activity ended.107
As in the first study, exposure to greater disparities decreased
support for reform. Whereas 33% of participants in the less-Black
condition would have signed the petition, this number declined to 12%
in the more-Black condition.108 This effect was significant and remained
regardless of how punitive participants viewed the stop-and-frisk
policy.109
Before addressing the mechanisms driving this behavior, one
related data point is instructive.110 In 2007, political scientists Mark
Peffley and Jon Hurwitz explored whether exposure to racial disparities
would affect support for the death penalty.111 To investigate, the
researchers divided a group of white Americans into three groups.112
Participants in the first group, the baseline condition, were asked to rate
their support for the death penalty without receiving any additional
information.113 Participants in the second group, the racial condition,
were asked the same question but were also told that the death penalty
was unfair because “most of the people who are executed are African
Americans.”114 Those in the third group, the innocent condition, were
again asked the same question but instead told that the “[death] penalty
is unfair because too many innocent people are being executed.”115
Consistent with Hetey and Eberhardt’s findings, support for the
death penalty increased when white participants learned about its
Id.
Id.
108 Id. at 1952.
109 Id.
110 Peffley & Hurwitz, supra note 20.
111 Id. at 999. Unlike Hetey and Eberhardt, Peffley and Hurwitz included Black participants.
Id. Unlike white participants, exposure to anti-Black bias did not increase support for the death
penalty among Black participants. Id. at 1001–02. For purposes of this Article, I focus on Peffley
and Hurwitz’s findings vis-à-vis white participants. I do so not to privilege the perspectives and
behavior of white participants—though I acknowledge that risk. Rather, I do so because white
Americans often exert outsized influence on the policies that govern most domains of public and
private life. Moreover, white liberals and progressives often deploy deficit frames when talking
to other whites. The backlash observed in these studies exposes the perverse effects that can result.
112 Id. at 999.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
106
107
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racially disparate impact.116 Whereas 65% of those in the baseline
condition supported the death penalty, that number increased to 77%
in the racial condition.117 Notably, exposure to the racial disparity also
increased the strength of support for the death penalty. Whereas 36% of
whites strongly favored the death penalty in the baseline condition, this
number jumped to 52% in the racial condition.118
Hetey and Eberhardt recognize the apparent dilemma: “Perhaps
motivating the public to work toward an equal society requires
something more than the evidence of inequality itself.”119 The studies,
in short, reveal the potential perverse consequences that can flow from
exposure to severe racial disparities—particularly among whites. That
said, the foregoing research should not be read as counseling against
any discussion of racial inequality. Rather, it surfaces that how we talk
about race can matter as much as whether we talk about race. One key
variable, to which I now turn, concerns how racial frames interact with
latent biases and dominant narratives of racial inequality.
B.
1.

The Source of Backlash
Latent Racial Biases

Participants in the foregoing studies were exposed to racial
disparities but received no information about the cause of those
disparities. The data’s import, in turn, lay in the eyes of the beholder.
For many participants, the disparities appear to have triggered antiBlack stereotypes and internal causal theories of crime. In other words,
even though the evidence of inequality was unaccompanied by
additional information, it did not enter a conceptual void. Rather, it
arose against a backdrop of latent racial narratives that attribute Black
overrepresentation in prison and death row to individual shortcomings
and cultural deficiencies.120

See id. at 1001.
Id. at 1002 tbl.1.
118 Id.
119 Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 9, at 1952.
120 See Hetey & Eberhardt, Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves, supra note 20, at 184–85
(“An alternative interpretation is that members of particular racial groups must be doing
something—namely committing crime—to capture the attention of police and be imprisoned at
higher rates. . . . Evidence of racial disparities in the criminal justice system, then, may activate
implicit stereotypical associations linking Blackness with crime, violence, threat, and
aggression.”).
116
117
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Consider the New York study. Relative to participants in the lessBlack condition, those in the more-Black condition exhibited greater
concern about crime.121 That heightened concern, in turn, decreased
support for the petition to end stop-and-frisk.122 Recall that the only
information that differed across conditions was the demographic
composition of New York’s prison population. Fear of crime—and
support for a controversial policy—increased when participants
believed New York’s incarcerated population was blacker.
To explain this effect, Hetey and Eberhardt invoke the
phenomenon of racial priming.123 Priming refers to the cognitive
process in which exposure to racial cues—including stereotypic
stimuli124—activates stereotypes about that group.125 Often, priming
occurs automatically and beyond our conscious awareness.126 Once
activated, this cognitive process “increases the likelihood that the
knowledge contained in the stereotype will be used in subsequent
judgments.”127 In other words, when an individual encounters racial
cues that activate racial stereotypes, those stereotypes tend to influence
Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 9, at 1952.
Id. (“[T]he effect of exposure to racial disparities in incarceration on petition signing was
driven, in part, by crime concern.”).
123 See Hetey & Eberhardt, Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves, supra note 20, at 185 (“Fear
and stereotypic associations also contribute. Indeed, we found that when Whites were exposed
to a ‘Blacker’ prison population, they became significantly more fearful of crime, which, in turn,
increased their support of punitive crime policies. Evidence of racial disparities in the criminal
justice system, then, may activate implicit stereotypical associations linking Blackness with crime,
violence, threat, and aggression.” (citation omitted)). Priming can occur through exposure to
characteristics associated with a social category. For example, a story about crime can trigger
racial stereotypes associated with blackness—even when race is not explicitly referenced. See
Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing Black: Race,
Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 876, 878 (2004).
124 This would include, for example, racially disparate arrest statistics that—even if
problematic for multiple reasons—link blackness with criminality. See Srividya
Ramasubramanian, Television Viewing, Racial Attitudes, and Policy Preferences: Exploring the
Role of Social Identity and Intergroup Emotions in Influencing Support for Affirmative Action, 77
COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 102, 106 (2010) (“Because of the chronic accessibility of racial
stereotypes, even subtle racial cues in the media are sufficient to activate racial attitudes that
influence decision making without requiring conscious effort.”).
125 See Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoë Robinson, Implicit White Favoritism in the
Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 879 (2015) (“Priming seeks to assess whether and
to what degree exposure to a concept or object (e.g., a black face) automatically activates
stereotypes (e.g., ‘black people are hostile’) or shapes stereotype-congruent responses to raceneutral prompts (e.g., rating an ambiguous shove as more aggressive).”).
126 See id. at 878–79.
127 Travis L. Dixon, Psychological Reactions to Crime News Portrayals of Black Criminals:
Understanding the Moderating Roles of Prior News Viewing and Stereotype Endorsement, 73
COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 162, 166 (2006).
121
122
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what the individual notices and how they interpret subsequently
encountered information.128
Given the tight conceptual nexus between blackness and
criminality,129 priming helps to explain why a blacker prison population
increased fears of crime.130 Specifically, “[e]vidence of racial disparities
in the criminal justice system” is likely to “trigger[] the stereotype that
Blacks are criminals and criminals are Black.”131 In the abstract, one
would expect the stereotype—now primed—to influence how
participants understand and respond to information about racial
inequality. In practice, this script appears to have transpired: exposure
to extreme racial disparities (in a criminal context) activated pervasive
anti-Black stereotypes and associated narratives that attribute mass
incarceration to internal factors—e.g., a predisposition to criminality.132
To visualize this dynamic, we can translate the “more-Black” and
“less-Black” conditions onto our racial inequality quadrants. Both
conditions constitute what I have termed thin deficit frames—that is,
racial discourse that emphasizes empirical evidence of inequality but
lacks an explicit causal theory. Here, that evidence is limited to a single
data point: prison population demographics. Both conditions
highlighted the overrepresentation (to differing degrees) of Black
inmates. Accordingly, both fall on the deficits side of our vertical axis—
with the “more-Black” condition falling farther down the line.
Neither condition included an express theory of causation.
Participant behavior, however, revealed that exposure to more extreme
racial disparities rendered more salient the association between
blackness and criminality—and by extension, internal causal theories of
Black criminality. This dynamic is depicted below. And, as the

128 See Galen V. Bodenhausen & Kurt Hugenberg, Attention, Perception, and Social Cognition,
in SOCIAL COGNITION: THE BASIS OF HUMAN INTERACTION 1, 3 (Fritz Strack & Jens Förster eds.,
2009) (“[N]ot all stimuli in the perceptual field receive equal attention; instead, some stimuli are
selected for relatively intense scrutiny, making them more likely to reach the threshold of
awareness, while others are processed only superficially, receiving little of our precious
attention.” (citation omitted)).
129 The contemporary force of this anti-Black stereotype is inseparable from a history of statesponsored antiblackness. See CalvinJohn Smiley & David Fakunle, From “Brute” to “Thug:” The
Demonization and Criminalization of Unarmed Black Male Victims in America, 26 J. HUM.
BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 350 (2016).
130 See Dixon, supra note 127, at 167 (“Previous research suggests that crime news featuring
more African Americans than Whites could lead to the activation and use of a ‘Black criminal’
stereotype.”).
131 Hetey & Eberhardt, Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves, supra note 20, at 185.
132 See id. at 184 (“By focusing on group traits [e.g., overincarceration], the possibility that
structural bias is at play in creating disparities falls out of view.”).
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foregoing scholarship cautions, the more a racial frame emphasizes
deficits and internal causal theories, the more likely backlash follows.

Peffley and Hurwitz observed a similar relationship between
exposure to empirical evidence of inequality, causal theories, and
support for progressive reform.133 Specifically, white participants were
more likely to support the death penalty if they attributed crime to
internal factors such as “criminal disposition[].”134 This effect only
arose, however, in the race condition—where participants were told
that the death penalty is unfair because “most of the people who are
executed are African Americans.”135 Even in this condition, causal
theories of Black overincarceration appeared to inform support (or lack
thereof) for the death penalty. As participants embraced more external
causal theories, their support for the death penalty waned.136

133 Prior research had found that internal causal theories of crime and poverty increased
support for punitive policies and reduced support for antipoverty programs. See Peffley &
Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 999.
134 Id. at 1004 (finding that whites “who feel that black arrest rates are more attributable to
the criminal dispositions of blacks are substantially more likely to support the death penalty than
those who attribute blame to a biased justice system”).
135 Id. at 999, 1005–06 (“Many whites begin with the belief that the reason blacks are punished
is because they deserve it, not because the system is racially biased against them.”).
136 See id. at 1005.
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This effect suggests that a single statement linking race and the
death penalty could activate latent anti-Black stereotypes and dominant
narratives about Black criminality.137 The effect was significant.
Whereas only twenty-eight percent of participants with external
theories of crime strongly favored the death penalty, that number
jumped to sixty-four percent for participants with internal theories of
crime.138
The link between stereotypes and causal theories of crime tracks
decades of research on stereotyping. Stereotypes are more than a set of
discrete (and often contestable) descriptors.139 The constellation of
stereotypes about a given category cohere to construct a “group
essence” through which all group members are viewed.140 Thus, when
we perceive someone to be a member of a racial outgroup,
“characteristics that are associated with the . . . group as a whole can be
inductively applied to this person.”141
Social psychologists Galen Bodenhausen and Andrew Todd
explain that “the hallmark of stereotyping is the tendency to regard
group members as fundamentally interchangeable and equivalent in
terms of their basic characteristics, which are simply the characteristics
that have come to be associated with the group as a whole.”142 Group
members, in effect, are rendered interchangeable and reduced to
stereotypical traits. As a result, stereotypes can inform how we view
members of racialized groups even when an individual’s actual
circumstances or characteristics deviate from the relevant stereotype.143

137 See id. at 1001 (“In the race condition, however, such causal beliefs are, doubtless, activated
by the question itself and should, therefore, become strong determinants of whites’ attitudes
toward the death penalty.”).
138 Id. at 1005; see also Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence
of Local Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 570–71 (2000).
139 See Galen V. Bodenhausen & Andrew R. Todd, Social Cognition, 1 WIRES COGNITIVE SCI.
160, 164 (2010) (explaining that “stereotypes do not consist merely of lists of features possessed
by a group”).
140 Id.
141 Id.; see also id. at 165 (“[S]tereotypes can bias attention and perception in a number of
ways.”); Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, supra note 128, at 10 (“After a target is assigned to a
particular category, such as a racial group, general attitudes toward that group create expectancies
of positive or negative characteristics that can bias perception of the target’s behavior.”).
142 Bodenhausen & Todd, supra note 139, at 164. Translated to the education domain, this
helps to explain why Black and Latinx students routinely confront presumptions of intellectual
inferiority even when their individual accolades—from trajectory (e.g., growing up in a middleclass community) to accomplishments (e.g., attending an elite university)—contradict those very
presumptions.
143 See Asad Rahim, Race as Unintellectual, 68 UCLA L. REV. 632, 660–63 (2021).
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Relatedly, stereotypes undergird causal theories that explain the
relationship between various traits associated with a group.144 On this
point, Bodenhausen and Todd explain that “a group may be thought of
as economically disadvantaged and poorly educated because its
members are lazy or lacking in intelligence.”145 In other words,
stereotypes describe groups and explain the relationship between
perceived group traits and a group’s relative status within society.146
Often, racial stereotypes rationalize the status quo by conceptually
undergirding internal causal theories of inequality. This dynamic, in
turn, can influence attitudes toward competing policy proposals. This
also tracks the dynamic we saw at play in the Hetey and Eberhardt
studies. When participants encountered extreme racial disparities,
those disparities appear to have activated latent anti-Black
stereotypes—including causal theories that explain and rationalize the
disparities themselves. And support for a status quo responsible for
those disparities—at least among whites—grew.
The studies reveal how exposure to racial inequality can provoke
immediate attitudinal and behavioral responses. This tight temporal
nexus between exposure and behavior is unlikely to reflect, precisely,
how racial frames embedded in litigation influence public perception
and behavior. Still, the studies reveal two critical insights that translate
to civil rights litigation. First, latent racial biases influence how the
public interprets and responds to evidence of racial inequality. Second,
deficit frames can activate and entrench those same biases.147
Accordingly, even in the absence of immediate backlash, exposure to
racial frames that emphasize minority deficits can calcify a set of racial
meanings that tend to legitimize existing inequality—including

See Bodenhausen & Todd, supra note 139, at 164.
Id. One can read this sentence, which does not reference race, and know immediately
which group the authors reference. This reflects the force and pervasiveness of anti-Black
stereotypes.
146 See also Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, supra note 128, at 11–12; TRAVIS L. DIXON, A
DANGEROUS DISTORTION OF OUR FAMILIES: REPRESENTATIONS OF FAMILIES, BY RACE, IN NEWS
AND OPINION MEDIA 19 (2017), https://colorofchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/COCFS-Families-Representation-Report_Full_121217.pdf
[https://perma.cc/58VQ-RVWZ]
(“[Racialized] images helped create a stereotype of poor people who are Black as part of the
[undeserving] poor (i.e., those who take advantage of the system) versus the deserving poor (i.e.,
those who have no choice but to utilize government assistance but only as a temporary
measure).”).
147 See JOHNSON & GODSIL, supra note 15, at 124 (arguing that calls for reform can have “the
unintended consequence of reinforcing the dominant narrative by inadvertently characterizing
boys and men of color as problematic or failing to achieve their potential”).
144
145

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3997957

FEINGOLD.43.5.2 (Do Not Delete)

2022]

6/30/22 1:14 PM

CIVIL RIGHTS CATCH-22S

1883

racialized expectations about who will succeed, who is a threat, and who
belongs.148
2.

Alternative Explanations (Also Implicate Racial Biases)

Some might wonder whether factors other than latent racial
stereotypes better explain the backlash outlined above. To address this
question, I explore multiple alternative theories below. This review
reveals that even alternative theories implicate the racial priming and
stereotyping phenomena discussed above.
To begin, white backlash could be the product of racial prejudice—
whether it be explicit anti-Black animus or racially selective
indifference.149 Assuming the latter—a more benign form of
prejudice—the theory proceeds as follows: if a punitive policy has
negative consequences, but Blacks bear the brunt of that burden, whites
will be more comfortable with the status quo and less motivated toward
reform (than they would be if the burden fell evenly across all groups or
disproportionately on whites).150
A selective-indifference theory has intuitive appeal. There are
myriad examples in which a person’s support for a policy turns on the
policy’s perceived effect on a salient in-group.151 This translates to
contexts in which regressive policies disparately burden communities
of color. Still, selective indifference feels insufficient to explain
enhanced support for policies that participants viewed as punitive.
Support for reform would have placed, at most, a marginal burden on
the participants (e.g., signing a petition). In other words, why not take
such a minimal step—even if the benefit accrues to a racial out-group?
One explanation is that participants viewed the status quo as
detrimental to Blacks and beneficial to whites. In other words, beyond
148 See Feingold & Carter, supra note 73, at 1708–09. See generally Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane,
Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 514–15 (2010)
(reviewing the literature).
149 See generally Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability
of Dworkin’s Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 n.56 (1996)
(discussing selective indifference and other forms of racial prejudice).
150 See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1976) (discussing “racially selective
sympathy and indifference”).
151 Selective-indifference theories emerged to explain the Trump administration’s failure to
aggressively address Covid-19 in the face of evidence that the virus was disproportionately
harming communities of color. See Brent Orrell, The Not-So-Soft Bigotry of COVID-19
Indifference, BULWARK (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.thebulwark.com/the-not-so-soft-bigotryof-covid-indifference (last visited Apr. 27, 2022).
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indifference to out-group suffering, participants perceived an in-group
benefit. The benefit, presumably, is less crime and more safety.
Ultimately, this cost-benefit analysis trades on the racial stereotypes
discussed above.152 Specifically, the logic that whites benefit relies on the
presumption that Blacks are overincarcerated because they are
predisposed to crime—that is, because they are perceived as threats to
whites.
Further, consider the “ultimate attribution error”153—a wellstudied cognitive bias that leads humans to “view negative attributes of
outgroups as stable, fixed, and dispositional.”154 With in-groups, in
contrast, negative attributes “are viewed as malleable, contingent, and a
result of environment or bad luck.”155 In the presence of positive
attributes, the reverse occurs.156
It is easy to see how the ultimate attribution error aligns with and
amplifies racial stereotypes and internal theories of racial inequality.157
Foreshadowing the next Part of this Article, consider racial discourse
that highlights the underrepresentation and underperformance of Black
and brown students in historically white institutions. For racial outgroups, the ultimate attribution error invites a causal theory that
attributes negative outcomes to student deficiencies. And, importantly,
this heuristic does not exist in a cultural void. To the contrary, it
operates against a backdrop defined by racialized presumptions

See supra Section II.B.1 (discussing conceptual nexus between blackness and criminality).
See generally Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s
Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 461 (1979). “The ultimate
attribution error is a group-based version of a more general attributional bias. When applied on
an individual basis, it is known as the actor-observer bias.” Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The
Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 424 n.39
(2006).
154 Kang & Lane, supra note 148, at 516 (describing how “motivations to justify the self and
the groups we belong to slant how we use or fail to use base-rate information”); see also Eric Luis
Uhlmann, Victoria L. Brescoll & David Pizarro, The Motivated Use and Neglect of Base Rates, 30
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIS. 284 (2007).
155 Kang & Lane, supra note 148, at 516; see also Jason A. Okonofua, Gregory M. Walton &
Jennifer L. Eberhardt, A Vicious Cycle: A Social-Psychological Account of Extreme Racial
Disparities in School Discipline, 11 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 381, 384 (2016) (“[A]ssociations can
alter . . . attributions about misbehavior and result in harsher punishment decisions.”); id.
(describing findings from separate study where “teachers were more likely to label a misbehaving
Black middle school student as a troublemaker than they were a misbehaving White middle
school student”).
156 Kang & Lane, supra note 148, at 516.
157 See Feingold & Carter, supra note 73, at 1706–07.
152
153
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concerning intelligence and academic competence.158 In other words,
the ultimate attribution error can further propel the feedback loop
between deficit frames, racial stereotypes, and internal theories of
inequality—a recursive process likely to harden support for
institutional arrangements that produce racially disparate academic
outcomes.159
As I detail below, school-financing litigants risk fueling this precise
dynamic. Particularly in the context of federal litigation, doctrine
incentivizes plaintiffs to mobilize deficit frames that emphasize
academic underachievement within communities of color. This legal
storytelling, albeit responsive to doctrine, can trigger and reproduce
stereotype-laden narratives that (a) describe Black and brown students
as academically inferior; (b) attribute racial achievement gaps to the
presumptive academic inferiority of Black and brown students; and (c)
prescribe remedies designed to “fix” presumptively deficient students
rather than remedy pervasive institutional deficiencies.
III. THE CATCH-22
As noted above, the civil rights catch-22 proceeds as follows: First,
certain legal doctrines incentivize (if not require) plaintiffs to
emphasize community deficits. Second, rational plaintiffs and their
lawyers respond in kind. In so doing, plaintiffs tend to deploy legal
narratives that track, and are thereby likely to activate and reinforce,
racial frames that legitimize the status quo. Accordingly, even when
plaintiffs prevail, the litigation can hinder short- and long-term reform
efforts. To concretize this dynamic, I now turn to federal schoolfinancing doctrine.

158 See Carbado, Turetsky & Purdie-Vaughns, supra note 70, at 177 (“[Pernicious narratives
of] Black intellectual inferiority ha[ve] long been an important part of the social transcript of
American life. Indeed, perhaps the only thing easier in the United States, racially speaking, than
questioning black intellectual ability is associating African Americans with crime.”).
159 See Dixon, supra note 127, at 183 (“The effects of stereotyping appear most potent with
regard to judgments regarding social policies.”).
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Doctrine Demands Deficits

In the United States, a student’s access to educational resources is
often inseparable from race and class.160 For communities burdened by
unequal or inadequate school funding, litigation offers one tool for
reform.161 Such lawsuits often take one of two forms: equity challenges
and adequacy challenges.162 Neither offers reliable avenues for relief—
particularly for claims arising under federal law.163
In equity cases, often brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause, plaintiffs challenge unequal resource
allocation—e.g., per-pupil spending.164 Even when funding disparities
have a racially disparate impact, those disparities are largely immune
from constitutional scrutiny.165 Rather, prevailing doctrine often
requires plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent—a near-impossible
standard to meet.166
Adequacy challenges, rather than comparing funding across
districts, focus on the substantive quality (or lack thereof) of education

160 It is important not to overstate the overlap between race and class, nor the degree to which
racial segregation predicts school quality. To begin, residential segregation is more likely to track
race than it does class. See Reynolds Farley, Charlotte Steeh, Maria Krysan, Tara Jackson & Keith
Reeves, Stereotypes and Segregation: Neighborhoods in the Detroit Area, 100 AM. J. SOCIO. 750,
751 (1994) (“If residential segregation were a matter of income, rich blacks would live with rich
whites and poor blacks with poor whites. This does not happen.”). Moreover, standard metrics
for measuring school “quality”—i.e., test scores—often do little more than reproduce school
demographics. See JACK SCHNEIDER, ASHLEY J. CAREY, PETER PIAZZA & RACHEL S. WHITE,
SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN MASSACHUSETTS: RACIAL DIVERSITY AND STATE ACCOUNTABILITY 20–
22 (2020), https://cecr.ed.psu.edu/sites/default/files/Demography_Report_FINAL_7.24.20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FY7N-DZNF] (questioning the presumption that residential segregation
predicts school quality).
161 See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for
a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1660 (2007) (noting that litigation is
one available option).
162 Elements of equity and adequacy challenges are often present in the same case. See id. at
1668 (“Adequacy contentions sometimes include equity arguments just as equity arguments
often include adequacy arguments.”).
163 Plaintiffs have found greater success with similar claims arising under state law. See
Wilson, supra note 2, at 191–92.
164 See id. at 203–05.
165 See Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in Education Through the No
Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 626 (2011) (“While
it is now illegal to deny children equal educational opportunities because of their race, it is
perfectly legal to provide disparate education opportunities to children based on where they live.”
(footnote omitted)).
166 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–41 (1976).
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within a school or district.167 Such cases, often tethered to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, trade on the theory that
the Constitution obligates each state to ensure “some meaningful level
of education is offered in the schools.”168 Adequacy challenges suffered
a major setback in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,169 a seminal school-financing case in which MexicanAmerican students argued that Texas’s school-financing scheme
deprived them of a right to education.170 A five-Justice majority rejected
the claim that the Constitution guarantees a general right to
education.171
As others have detailed, this holding effectively “foreclosed federal
challenges to long-standing educational opportunity gaps.”172
Nonetheless, recent federal litigation has revealed that Rodriguez might
not have closed the door on federal adequacy challenges.173 In Gary B.,
for example, the plaintiffs marshalled language from Rodriguez and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions to argue that the Constitution
guarantees “some identifiable quantum of education”174—even if it does
not guarantee a general right to education.
This includes Papasan v. Allain,175 in which the Supreme Court
explained that “[a]s Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet
definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate
education is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to
discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened
equal protection review.”176 In other words, even absent a “broad,

See Wilson, supra note 2, at 205.
Cf. Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School Finance
Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1206 (2011) (describing the difference between equity and
advocacy challenges in the context of state constitutional claims).
169 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
170 See id. at 4–5, 29.
171 See id. at 35.
172 Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Introduction. The Essential Questions Regarding a Federal
Right to Education, in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR
DEMOCRACY 1, 1 (Kimberly Jenkins Robinson ed., 2019); see also Robinson, supra note 161, at
1667 (“[School financing] cases quickly met a roadblock to federal constitutional claims in
Rodriguez when the Supreme Court rejected an argument that education is a fundamental
constitutional right.”).
173 See infra Section III.B.
174 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36–37.
175 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
176 Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
167
168
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general right to education,”177 the Constitution may still obligate states
to provide a minimum standard of education.178
Whether such an obligation exists remains unanswered, in part,
because no plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to establish that they
were denied “a minimally adequate education”179—at least not facts
sufficient to persuade five sitting Justices. In Rodriguez, for example, the
Court acknowledged that Texas’s funding scheme produced severe
disparities across the state’s poorest and richest districts.180 Nonetheless,
the majority emphasized that neither those disparities nor other alleged
facts established that Texas had deprived the students a basic minimum
education:
[W]e have no indication that the present levels of educational
expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short. . . . [I]n
the present case . . . no charge fairly could be made that the system
fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech
and of full participation in the political process.181

The Papasan plaintiffs—who included school officials and
children from twenty-three Mississippi counties—met a similar fate.
Among other claims, the plaintiffs argued that they were “denied the
economic benefits of public school lands granted by” the federal
government to Mississippi over a century prior.182 This claim was
predicated in part on funding disparities that flowed from the state’s
conduct vis-à-vis the subject lands. According to the plaintiffs, absent
court intervention, their children would “continue to receive a
substandard education.”183 As in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
majority concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to

177 Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 644 (6th Cir.) (first citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33–39;
and then citing Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2000)), vacated, reh’g en banc granted
mem., 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
178 See Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915, 956
(2016) (“Despite the passage of more than forty years, there is still no definitive answer to the
question left undecided by Rodriguez: is there a federal constitutional right to ‘some identifiable
quantum of education’? Rodriguez’s successors—Plyler, Papasan, and Kadrmas—failed to settle
the matter . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
179 See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285–86; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37; see also Gary B., 957 F.3d at 642
(“While the Supreme Court has repeatedly discussed this issue, it has never decided it, and the
question of whether such a right exists remains open today.”).
180 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 8–15.
181 Id. at 36–37.
182 Papasan, 478 U.S. at 268.
183 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 18, Papasan, 478 U.S. 265 (No. 85-499), 1985 WL 669401, at
*18.
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prove that Mississippi had denied them a minimally adequate
education:
The petitioners do not allege that schoolchildren in the Chickasaw
Counties are not taught to read or write; they do not allege that they
receive no instruction on even the educational basics; they allege no
actual facts in support of their assertion that they have been deprived
of a minimally adequate education.184

In so doing, Papasan reaffirmed Rodriguez’s central holding and
left open the possibility that the Constitution guarantees a minimally
adequate education. This possibility offers a pinhole-sized opening for
adequacy challenges today. Still, the burden is hard to overstate. A
plaintiff must first establish, as a matter of law, that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a basic minimum education.185 Then, the
plaintiff must marshal enough evidence to establish that she has, in fact,
been “deprived of a minimally adequate education”186—a burden no
prior plaintiff has met.
For the rational litigant (and her attorney), this backdrop cautions
against a complaint that suggests even a pretense of education. A party
would not want to lose because educational conditions were bad, but
not so bad that a fact finder could conclude that constitutional baselines
were met.187 To avoid such a fate, strategic plaintiffs might portray their
community through a prism of poverty and illiteracy—a landscape void
of academic possibility. In other words, and drawing on the racial
inequality quadrants introduced above,188 legal doctrine incentivizes
plaintiffs to employ deficit frames.
This script has played out across multiple recent lawsuits, two of
which I discuss below. The narratives animating these lawsuits are far
from identical. But they converge in two key respects. First, they seek to
navigate the pinhole left open following Rodriguez. Second, to meet this
high evidentiary burden, the plaintiffs employ metaphors, statistics, and
anecdotes to portray poor, illiterate students of color incapable of

Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.
See, e.g., Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted
mem., 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
186 Id. at 647–48 (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286).
187 District Judge William Smith, who presided over A.C. v. Raimondo, expressed a similar
point when he rejected plaintiffs’ adequacy claims in that litigation: “But . . . just how bad did an
education have to be to trigger a constitutional violation? Education advocates thought they
found the answer to that question, and a test case, in Detroit.” A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F. Supp.
3d 170, 189 (D.R.I. 2020), aff’d sub nom. A.C. v. McKee, 23 F.4th 37 (1st Cir. 2022).
188 See supra Section I.B (employing 2x2 grid to categorize competing racial inequality
frames).
184
185
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becoming full citizens.189 As a result, this well-intended litigation
engages in racial storytelling that reifies pernicious biases about the
intellectual inferiority of Black and brown students.190
B.

The Deficit Frame Cases

Before exploring the deficit frame cases, two preliminary
comments are warranted.
First, my goal is to surface unintended consequences that can flow
from well-meaning lawsuits and the narratives they employ. I am
neither denying nor suggesting anyone ignore the disturbing conditions
and inequities that trigger cases like Gary B.191 Nor am I suggesting we
can realize a more equitable educational landscape without naming and
centering the forces that produce and sustain racial (and class-based)
inequities.192 But even accepting that racial reform requires that we193
talk about racial inequality does not answer how we talk about racial
inequality. That question—how to talk about racial inequality—is my
focus herein.194
Second, school-financing doctrine impedes educational equality
on multiple levels. In this Article, I focus on the link between doctrine
and deficit frames—that is, how legal doctrine incentivizes plaintiffs
and their attorneys to employ racial frames prone to calcify conditions
that produce inequality. But school-financing doctrine is also
responsible, in part, for the conditions that necessitate school-financing
See, e.g., A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d at 194–96.
See Okonofua, Walton & Eberhardt, supra note 155, at 384 (“Blacks are commonly
stereotyped as unintelligent, lazy, hostile, and dangerous.”).
191 See Robinson, supra note 161, at 1656 (“More than fifty years and a host of educational
reform efforts have passed since Brown v. Board of Education, and yet children in poor and
disproportionately minority communities still receive vastly unequal educational
opportunities.”); Wilson, supra note 165, at 647–48 (“[S]chools that are segregated by race are
also typically segregated by poverty as well. . . . [A] significant number of students who attend
predominantly poor and minority schools receive lesser access to adequate educational resources
and have lower academic achievement than their white and more affluent peers.”); Thomas
Kleven, Federalizing Public Education, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 394 (2010) (“[P]ublic education in
the United States is significantly segregated along class and race lines.”).
192 Ian Haney López, for example, urges a progressive discourse that fuses race and class
concerns. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, MERGE LEFT: FUSING RACE AND CLASS, WINNING ELECTIONS,
AND SAVING AMERICA (2019).
193 In this instance, I use the term “we” to encompass a broad spectrum of stakeholders
committed to a more racially just society.
194 As I note elsewhere, there is not a single answer to how one should talk about race. That
answer is necessarily contingent and informed by variables ranging from speaker and audience
to context and purpose. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
189
190
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litigation in the first place.195 As others have detailed, the Supreme
Court has (a) legally immunized de facto segregation;196 (b) limited a
municipality’s power to mitigate the negative effects of segregation;197
and (c) privileged the principle of “localism.”198 In essence, the Supreme
Court has constitutionalized unequal access to education.199 And in so
doing, the Court has commodified whiteness itself.200
195 School-financing doctrine—and the Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence more
broadly—incentivizes and insulates behaviors and conditions that stratify society along race and
class lines. See Wilson, supra note 165, at 628 (“Doctrinally, the . . . federal judiciary is situated
such that it cannot adequately address issues of racial and economic inequality in schools.”).
Other factors include structural forces ranging from discriminatory lending policies to schoolfunding schemes. See id. at 650 (“[T]he FHA’s racially discriminatory lending practices and the
proliferation of federally subsidized highways served to relegate minorities to decaying urban
cities while helping to populate suburban enclaves with white citizens.”); Kleven, supra note 191,
at 392 (“A second, and greater, factor contributing to unequal educational opportunity is the
structure of public education.”).
196 See Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 209–10 (2016)
(“[R]acially segregated neighborhood schools now operate with the imprimatur of the law . . . .
[T]hey are accepted as an inevitable reality that cannot be changed absent extraordinary
measures.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
111, 112 (2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court, and the lower federal courts, have done nothing to
advance desegregation of schools or to equalize expenditures for education.”); Robinson, supra
note 161, at 1660–67 (describing the federal judiciary’s failure to realize effective schooldesegregation plans).
197 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (prohibiting efforts to equalize educational
opportunity through interdistrict desegregation plans unless there was proof of discrimination
across the subject districts); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007) (striking down race-conscious student assignment plan).
198 See Wilson, supra note 165, at 628 (“Time and again, the federal judiciary has deferred to
local school officials in their school financing schemes and student assignment plans, even when
the decisions of these local officials have adverse impacts on educational opportunities for poor
and minority students.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 636 (“Since its 1955 decision in [Brown II],
the Supreme Court has consistently expressed a doctrinal preference for principles of localism at
the expense of the constitutional rights of minority and poor students.” (footnote omitted));
LaToya Baldwin Clark, Education as Property, 105 VA. L. REV. 397, 399 (2019) (“[T]he Court
defeated desegregation efforts on two fronts: first, by allowing local communities to
geographically restrict attendance in local schools; and second, by allowing those same
communities to sequester educational money locally.”).
199 See Wilson, supra note 165, at 644–45 (“Because students for the most part attend schools
in close proximity to the neighborhoods in which they live, the true ramifications of the Court’s
embrace of localism can only be understood within the larger context of residential housing
segregation and the federal, state, and local laws that perpetuate such segregation.”).
200 The law, in other words, invites white communities to invoke public and private means to
police racial and physical boundaries—both of which fuel hypersegregation and educational
inequities across the country. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707
(1993); K-Sue Park, How Did Redlining Make Money?, JUST MONEY (Sept. 25, 2020),
https://justmoney.org/k-sue-park-how-did-redlining-make-money
[https://perma.cc/SB3NE3RA] (“Redlining indeed institutionalized segregation’s monetary value, transforming the
landscapes of housing and racial relations in America.”).
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I now turn to Detroit, the site of Gary B. v. Whitmer and a city long
impacted by this jurisprudential backdrop.
1.

Gary B. v. Whitmer

Gary B. v. Whitmer targeted some of Detroit’s most
underresourced public schools. In a moment, I turn to the plaintiffs’
case. But to contextualize the litigation, it is helpful to understand how
decades of structural (including legal) and behavioral forces created the
conditions that underlay this lawsuit.201
Like many American cities, Detroit experienced staggering
demographic shifts through much of the twentieth century. Relevant
causes range from economic restructuring to white flight (among other
forms of white resistance to desegregation).202 Between 1950 and 1990,
Detroit’s white population fell by 86%, while its Black residents rose
from 16% to 76% of the city’s population.203 In the decade following the
1968 Fair Housing Act, Detroit lost 74% of its white students.204 And
between 1980 and 1995, the percentage of white students in Detroit
public schools further declined from 14% to 6.2%.205 Many of the
resulting racially homogenous (read: white) suburbs and suburban
school districts continue to this day.206
In short, Detroit in 2022 is inseparable from the anti-Black bias
and white flight that defined much of the last half century.207 The city’s
overall population decline, alongside the loss of white residents (and
their tax dollars) to the suburbs, drained Detroit’s tax base and the

201 For a more comprehensive review, which is beyond the scope of this Article, see GROVER
& VAN DER VELDE, supra note 3 (providing historical overview of public schools in Detroit).
202 See Thomas J. Sugrue, Expert Report of Thomas J. Sugrue, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 270
(1999) (explaining that Blacks “bore the brunt of the effects of economic restructuring that
began . . . in the early 1950s as Michigan’s urban job base began to erode when firms moved to
white suburban and rural areas”); id. at 291 (describing “a successful campaign to recall the four
white school board members who supported the [desegregation] plan”). Beyond white flight,
whites engaged in racialized violence, political action, and other concerted efforts to maintain
racially exclusionary neighborhoods and schools. See id. at 277–85 (summarizing history of antiBlack and anti-Latinx violence and discrimination in Detroit).
203 Farley, Steeh, Krysan, Jackson & Reeves, supra note 160, at 754.
204 See Sugrue, supra note 202, at 291.
205 Id.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 280 (“[Whites’ commitment to racial exclusion] “was vividly demonstrated in the
early 1940s, when a developer of a subdivision for whites in northwest Detroit secured
government-backed loans on the condition . . . that a wall be constructed to separate the two
neighborhoods.”).
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public resources it supports—including public education.208 This
exodus has not ceased. Over the past twenty years, a confluence of local
forces has exacerbated Detroit’s budgetary challenges and management
failures.209
This history—albeit abbreviated—leads to Gary B. v. Whitmer, a
2016 lawsuit that featured Black and Latinx students from “several of
Detroit’s worst-performing public schools.”210 Among other claims, the
students alleged that Michigan violated their constitutional right to a
basic minimum education.211 More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged
that “not even the pretense of education [took] place” in their “slumlike” schools—and as a result, they were denied “a chance at
foundational literacy.”212 Drawing on facts and narratives that
emphasized racial achievement gaps, deteriorating academic facilities,
and widespread community disinvestment, the plaintiffs portrayed
themselves and their community through a lens of poverty and
illiteracy.213 Translated to our racial inequality frames, the dominant
racial discourse that surrounded Gary B. falls into our bottom-left
quadrant.

208 See GROVER & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 3 (noting that from a peak of nearly 300,000
students in 1966, Detroit public schools had just 47,000 students in 2016).
209 These forces include continued enrollment decline, the rise of charter schools, abandoned
city property, hundreds of school closures, and the appointment of multiple emergency
managers. See id. (reviewing enrollment decline and school closures); Jennifer Chambers,
Student Exodus Saps Detroit School Finances, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 30, 2015, 10:20 AM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/education/2015/03/30/student-exodus-saps-detroitschool-finances/70652450 [https://perma.cc/ZK7B-5DXF].
210 Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted mem., 958
F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs’ schools served more than ninety-five percent children of
color and primarily low-income students. Id. at 637.
211 Id. at 621.
212 Id. at 621, 624.
213 See id. at 624–28.
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This deficit framing came to define lay and legal perceptions of the
case.214 The Sixth Circuit, for example, foregrounded the plaintiffs’
“core” claim “that the conditions in their schools are so bad—due to the
absence of qualified teachers, crumbling facilities, and insufficient
materials—that those schools fail to provide access to literacy.”215
Beyond formal court documents, this illiteracy/poverty framing
extended to the litigants’ more public-facing communications.216 This
included the plaintiffs’ website, which bore the title “Right to Literacy
Detroit.”217 Beyond this broad framing, the homepage included a

214 See, e.g., Carole Levine, Michigan Settles Court Case and Agrees to Reinvest in Detroit Public
Schools, NONPROFIT Q. (May 19, 2020), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/michigan-settles-courtcase-and-agrees-to-reinvest-in-detroit-public-schools [https://perma.cc/Q7HB-B4SV] (“The
suit alleges that many of the graduates emerging from both public and charter schools in Detroit
had limited literacy skills due to a system ‘functionally incapable of delivering access to
literacy.’”).
215 Gary B., 957 F.3d at 624.
216 See, e.g., Christopher Peak & Emily Hanford, In Gary B. v. Snyder, a Federal Court Rules
Giving Children a Chance at Literacy Is a Constitutional Right, HECHINGER REP. (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://hechingerreport.org/in-gary-b-v-snyder-a-federal-court-rules-giving-children-achance-at-literacy-is-a-constitutional-right [https://perma.cc/6LWY-N9TU] (“This lawsuit is
designed to show that there are particular pockets, where we would say it’s not just that the kids
are not becoming literate; it’s that they don’t have the opportunity to become literate . . . .”).
217 RIGHT TO LITERACY DETROIT, https://www.detroit-accesstoliteracy.org [https://perma.cc/
5AB3-CBQJ].
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drawing of three Black children alongside the prominent text: “GARY
B. v. SNYDER is a civil rights lawsuit asserting that Michigan is denying
Detroit students their fundamental right to LITERACY.”218
From a legal and moral standpoint, this narrative—a story
highlighting the plight of illiterate students of color—holds intuitive
appeal. It also proved effective as a litigation strategy. As noted above,
the plaintiffs secured a substantial settlement.219 And even before the
settlement, a Sixth Circuit panel had revived the plaintiffs’ adequacy
claim.220
On the law, the panel held that the Constitution guarantees a basic
minimum education and that foundational literacy is encompassed
therein.221 Drawing on Rodriguez, the panel grounded this conclusion
in the relationship between education and democracy. Specifically, the
panel reasoned that “without the literacy provided by a basic minimum
education, it is impossible to participate in our democracy.”222 In certain
respects, this connection is just right. As Derek Black and others remind
us, multiracial democracy requires equal access to public education and
the ballot box.223 But the framing also carries risks. At its core, the
message—from the litigants and the court—suggests that Detroit’s
Black and brown students are destined to illiteracy, and thereby
rendered unable to participate in, or contribute to, American society.
This narrative, albeit marshalled to advance racial equality, echoes
blatantly racist calls to restrict Black voting following the Civil War.224
Moving to the facts, the panel found that the students plausibly
pled their adequacy claim.225 Given the plaintiffs’ allegations—and
Id.
See Whitmer Press Release, supra note 1.
220 Gary B., 957 F.3d at 621. Following the settlement, while the case was pending to be reheard
en banc, the panel opinion was vacated. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020)
(mem.).
221 See Gary B., 957 F.3d at 659–60.
222 Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
223 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[Education] is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. . . . [I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”); DEREK W. BLACK,
SCHOOLHOUSE BURNING: PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2020).
224 See, e.g., NEIL R. MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM
CROW 43–44 (Illini Books ed. 1990) (“‘If every negro in Mississippi was a graduate of Harvard,
and had been elected class orator, . . . ’ the Clarion-Ledger affirmed, ‘he would not be as well fitted
to exercise the rights of suffrage as the Anglo-Saxon farm laborer.’” (alteration in original)).
225 See Gary B., 957 F.3d at 660–61.
218
219
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assuming a right to a minimum education—this conclusion would
appear hard to avoid.226 The Gary B. plaintiffs offered a dire account of
their “schools” and the conditions therein.227 Consider the following
overview:
“Plaintiffs sit in classrooms where not even the pretense of education
takes place, in schools that are functionally incapable of delivering
access to literacy.” Because of this, Plaintiffs attend “schools in name
only, characterized by slum-like conditions and lacking the most
basic educational opportunities that children elsewhere in Michigan
and throughout the nation take for granted. [T]hey wholly lack the
capacity to deliver basic access to literacy, functionally delivering no
education at all. The schools Plaintiffs attend, and attended, are not
truly schools by any traditional definition or understanding of the
role public schools play in affording access to literacy.”228

The plaintiffs also marshalled striking factual allegations. These
included a litany of statistics that illustrated the inadequacy of the
students’ education—in absolute and relative terms. The following
allegations are illustrative:
• Across the plaintiffs’ schools, “proficiency rates . . . hover near zero
in nearly all subject areas.”229
• In one of the plaintiffs’ elementary schools, “only 4.2% of students
scored proficient or above on . . . Michigan’s 2015–16 English
assessment test, compared with 46.0% of third-grade students
statewide.”230

226 Even in dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint, the district court recognized the appalling
conditions they challenged. See Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 366 (E.D. Mich. 2018)
(“The conditions and outcomes of Plaintiffs’ schools, as alleged, are nothing short of devastating.
When a child who could be taught to read goes untaught, the child suffers a lasting injury—and
so does society. But the Court is faced with a discrete question: does the Due Process Clause
demand that a State affirmatively provide each child with a defined, minimum level of education
by which the child can attain literacy? Based on the foregoing analysis, the answer to the question
is no.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir.), vacated,
reh’g en banc granted mem., 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
227 The plaintiffs placed quotation marks around the word “school”—presumably to
emphasize the schools’ failure to serve their basic purpose as sites of learning. See Brief of
Appellants at 20–21, Gary B., 957 F.3d 616 (Nos. 18-1855/18-1871), 2018 WL 6044766, at *20–21
(“Plaintiffs’ ‘schools’ contain classrooms that have no teachers . . . . By compelling Plaintiffs to
attend these ‘schools’ each day . . . Defendants have violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
228 Gary B., 957 F.3d at 624 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
229 Id. at 627.
230 Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3997957

FEINGOLD.43.5.2 (Do Not Delete)

2022]

6/30/22 1:14 PM

CIVIL RIGHTS CATCH-22S

1897

• Across the plaintiffs’ high schools, between 2% to 13% of eleventhgrade students were proficient in English, compared with nearly
50% of eleventh-grade students statewide.231
• Across their high schools, “every eleventh grader has 0% proficiency
in at least Math, Science, or Social Studies.”232
• Between 0% to 4% of eleventh graders in the plaintiffs’ schools were
proficient in Math, Science, and Social Studies, respectively,233 as
compared to between 28% to 44% of students statewide.234
• At Osborn MST, only 1.9% of eleventh graders were proficient in
English in the 2014–15 school year, as compared to 49% of students
statewide.235

The plaintiffs thickened this statistical account by cataloging their
schools’ “‘deplorable’ and ‘devastating’” conditions, which they
disaggregated across three categories: (1) lack of qualified teachers;236
(2) a “dearth of instructional materials”;237 and (3) unsanitary and
dangerous physical conditions.238
Overall, the plaintiffs’ claims are striking. They reveal an
educational wasteland—likely unrecognizable to most Americans.

Id. at 65 fig.6.
Brief of Appellants, supra note 227, at 12.
233 Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 65 fig.6.
234 Id.
235 Brief of Appellants, supra note 227, at 47.
236 Id. at 7–8 (“[S]cience classes . . . were taught by a paraprofessional who acknowledged that
she did not understand the material and could not lead experiments. . . . [S]eventh- and eighthgrade math [classes] were taught for about a month by an eighth-grade student, with a
paraprofessional sitting in the room to assist with classroom management. . . . [A]pproximately
30–40% of teachers were uncertificated, while many classes, like Science and Health, were taught
by uncertificated long-term substitutes—and high school students are repeatedly shown movies
like Kung Fu Panda and Frozen during scheduled class time.”).
237 Id. at 9 (“Not one of Plaintiffs’ schools has textbooks for students to bring home, making
it difficult for teachers to assign meaningful homework or, in many instances, any homework at
all. . . . [A] history class had five textbooks for 28 students and the economics class had 25
textbooks for 118 students for the 2016–17 school year. . . . Teachers regularly tape up old,
dilapidated copies, seek donations of books online, and spend thousands of dollars of their own
monies (as much as one-sixth of their salary) to purchase books.”).
238 Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 85 (“All of Plaintiffs’ schools that are currently
operating have been infested by vermin. Students and teachers have frequently encountered mice,
mice droppings, rats, bedbugs, and/or cockroaches.”); id. at 91 (“The water fountains, toilets,
urinals, sinks, and locker room showers at Osborn are frequently out of order, and the bathrooms
are frequently out of toilet paper and soap.”); Brief of Appellants, supra note 227, at 10
(“[C]lassrooms regularly reach as high as 90 degrees in the summer-adjacent months, even 110
degrees in one school, and students and teachers have fainted, thrown up, and developed heat
rashes as a result. . . .”).
231
232
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Given this factual backdrop and doctrinal hurdles, why not mobilize a
corresponding narrative that emphasizes racialized poverty and
illiteracy?239 After all, the plaintiffs ultimately secured a legal victory and
robust settlement. The danger, of course, is that even with a litigation
win, this narrative could harden the very forces that produce such
unequal and inadequate conditions in the first place.240 Even if tethered
to a deeply troubling reality, this frame—that effectively defines Black
and brown students as “illiterate,” impoverished, future wards of the
state—tracks pernicious anti-Black stereotypes.241 In short, by
promulgating this narrative, the litigation risks reifying those very
stereotypes—which themselves presume and rationalize racial
disparities across educational domains.242
In Part IV, I explore how the Gary B. plaintiffs could have reduced
these risks without obscuring or otherwise eliding the educational
injustice they endured. Before doing so, however, I turn to A.C. v.
Raimondo, a separate adequacy challenge based in Rhode Island.
Although distinct from Gary B., A.C. offers another example of
doctrinal demands driving legal narratives that emphasize student
deficits.
2.

A.C. v. Raimondo

In 2018, a putative class of Rhode Island public school students
sued their state for failing to provide a basic minimum education.243 As
in Gary B., the A.C. plaintiffs targeted the narrow window left open by
Rodriguez.244 Yet unlike the Gary B. plaintiffs, who alleged a lack of
access to basic literacy, the A.C. plaintiffs argued that Rhode Island

See supra Section III.A (outlining school-financing doctrine).
See supra Part II (exploring risks associated with deficit framing).
241 See generally Feingold, supra note 86 (outlining how deficit framing could reap negative
consequences in K–12 and university settings).
242 Given how stereotyping functions, it matters little that this case involved such extreme
conditions. See Peak & Hanford, supra note 216 (“Gary B. v. Snyder was ‘surgically precise’ in
seeking remedies for kids in ‘the worst of the worst schools.’”).
243 A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 170, 174 (D.R.I. 2020), aff’d sub nom. A.C. v. McKee,
23 F.4th 37 (1st Cir. 2022). On October 13, 2020, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ federal
adequacy claim. See id. at 192–93 (distinguishing A.C. from Gary B.).
244 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to the Joint Motion to Dismiss at 1, 6, 13, A.C., 494
F. Supp. 3d 170 (No. 18-cv-645) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum] (“[T]he state defendants
have not adopted sufficient policies and standards to ensure that the full ‘quantum’ of education
necessary for civic preparation in the 21st century is being made available to all students in Rhode
Island . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
239
240
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failed to provide a civics education necessary “to be capable citizens”
able “to participate effectively” in a democracy.245
From this point of departure, the plaintiffs presented a story of
incapable and unprepared students.246 Consider the complaint, which
characterized the putative class as follows:
[T]he . . . defendants have failed to provide . . . students in the state
of Rhode Island an education that is adequate to prepare them to
function productively as civic participants capable of voting, serving
on a jury, understanding economic, social and political systems
sufficiently to make informed choices, and to participate effectively
in civic activities.247

This passage captures the plaintiffs’ core theory: Rhode Island has
deprived them of “the basic knowledge, skills, experiences, and values
they need to function productively as civic participants . . . .
and . . . ‘contribute . . . to the progress of our nation.’”248
This narrative transcends the plaintiffs’ briefing. It also animates
their public communications—including the content and messaging on
their website. As one example, during the trial, the website’s homepage
expressed the same message conveyed by the above block quote.249 The
website’s “About” page, in turn, adds texture to this narrative by
foregrounding the following statement and quote (from a class
member):
[The putative class is] being denied the opportunity for an adequate
education to prepare them to be capable citizens.
“I have attended the public schools in Rhode Island for my entire life
and have not been exposed to how to engage sufficiently in critical

245 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 2–4, A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d 170 (No. 18-cv-645); see also
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 244, at 23 (“Whatever the specific elements of the ‘quantum
of education’ that the Court may determine after trial, plaintiffs submit that it will include much
more than the basic literacy skills that are the focus of the claims in Gary B. v. Snyder. . . .”).
246 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 245, at 34 (advancing narrative that tethers
“inadequate educational opportunities” to students “ill-prepared to function effectively in our
society”); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 244, at 19 (arguing that class members are denied
“an education that is adequate to prepare them to function productively as civic participants,
even though such an education is being provided to other students in the state”).
247 Class Action Complaint, supra note 245, at 3–4 (emphasis added); see also id. at 5–6
(“[D]efendants . . . failed to provide [the class] with adequate opportunities to develop the civic
knowledge, skills, experiences and values they need to function productively as civic
participants.”).
248 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 244, at 27 (third alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982)).
249 See COOK (A.C.) V. MCKEE, http://www.cookvmckee.info [https://perma.cc/6XU2-T9KF].
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thinking or even the basics of how to participate in democratic
institutions.”250

In essence, the plaintiffs characterize class members as the
damaged byproducts of a dysfunctional educational system—a system
that renders students unable to perform core functions in a
constitutional democracy. To advance this narrative, the plaintiffs offer
a series of factual allegations that detail the class members’ alleged
plight—in absolute terms and relative to students from whiter and
wealthier schools. The plaintiffs cite, for example, a lack of physical
resources in their classrooms,251 a lack of quality teachers,252 and the
general inadequacy of their curriculum.253
Much of the foregoing resembles Gary B. One notable departure is
that race and racial inequality are less explicit in the A.C. plaintiffs’
narrative. In Gary B., the plaintiffs made racial inequality central to
their legal claims.254 The A.C. plaintiffs, in contrast, deploy a narrative
that renders race less salient to their story.255
This is not to say that race is absent from A.C. On the one hand,
the plaintiffs define the class in race-neutral terms. At the same time,
they situate Black and Latinx students as the face of the litigation—that

250 About, COOK (A.C.) V. MCKEE, http://www.cookvmckee.info/about [https://perma.cc/
5EX9-KAFL].
251 Class Action Complaint, supra note 245, at 27 (“The plaintiffs attend schools that have outof-date computers in inadequate numbers to sufficiently provide access to critical educational
opportunities . . . . Few of the schools that plaintiffs have attended have the necessary databases
for appropriate research necessary for civic preparedness.”).
252 Id. at 26 (“[T]he vast majority of teachers . . . have not been trained in civics in general,
and, specifically, have received no training or inadequate training in how to facilitate meaningful
conversations on controversial issues . . . .”); id. at 27 (“[M]ost teachers in Rhode Island have had
no training in teaching media literacy skills and [few schools have] sufficient skilled library media
specialists . . . .”).
253 Id. at 28 (“[S]tudents in [plaintiffs’ schools] . . . receive no instruction in how to conduct
[online] research effectively . . . , how to determine the sources of information . . . , and whether
such information is accurate or misleading.”).
254 This resulted from the plaintiffs’ express framing and the backdrop of Detroit—a city
associated with its majority-Black population. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants, supra note 227, at 3
(“These schools, which serve almost exclusively low-income children of color, are schools ‘in
name only’—buildings that warehouse children instead of educating them.” (emphasis added));
Terrell Jermaine Starr, Detroit: Why The D Is the Blackest City of All Time, ROOT (Feb. 26, 2019,
9:00
AM),
https://www.theroot.com/detroit-why-the-d-is-the-blackest-city-of-all-time1832881152 [https://perma.cc/ACG2-MDLK].
255 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 244, at 36 (“The present plaintiffs might be
described . . . as a ‘large, diverse and amorphous class unified only by the common factor of
residence in districts that happen to [provide substantially less adequate civic preparation] than
other districts.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973))).
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is, the primary victims of Rhode Island’s educational shortcomings who
graduate unable to “contribute . . . to the progress of our nation.”256
For example, even as the plaintiffs decry Rhode Island’s public
education in universalist terms, they highlight the disproportionate
impact on low-income Black and Latinx students.257 To buttress these
general allegations, the plaintiffs cite several racial achievement gaps.
The following examples are illustrative:
• “For the 2015–[2016] school year, only 24% of Latino students met
3rd grade expectations in reading, compared with 49% of white
students, and 28% of Latino students met 3rd grade expectations in
math, compared to 53% of white students.”258
• “[O]nly 22% of African American and Latino students and 23% of
low-income students achieved proficient scores on [statewide
English] exams, compared with 49% of White students.”259
• “For 2017, Rhode Island’s Latino students ranked 49th out of the 49
states for which data was available.”260
• The plaintiffs provide nationwide statistics on the “‘civic
empowerment gap’ for many African-American and Latino students
and for many students from low-income families.”261
• “[O]n the 2014 NAEP 8th Grade test in civics, while 32% of white
eighth graders performed at or above the proficient level, only 9% of
black students and 12% of Latino students did the same.”262

The plaintiffs also highlight the plight of English Language
Learners (ELLs):
Many students in Rhode Island, and especially those attending
schools in low-income areas, and many [ELLs], do not develop
256 Id. at 27 (alteration in original) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982)). As I’ve
noted throughout, I am not contesting that race impacts a student’s ability to access wellresourced sites of learning in Rhode Island. Race matters. But that reality does not determine
how one can or should describe this reality or the students it impacts.
257 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 245, at 31 (“Because of resource deficiencies in
schools in low-income areas, there has been an increasing gap in recent years between the
experiential and extracurricular opportunities available to students in affluent communities and
those from low-income households, many of whom are African-American, Latino or come from
low-income areas.”); id. at 36 (“The lack of meaningful educational opportunities for Latino
students in Rhode [Island] is a direct cause of grossly unacceptable academic outcomes for these
students.”).
258 Id. at 36.
259 Id. at 25.
260 Id. at 37.
261 Id. at 13.
262 Id.
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adequate basic verbal skills and do not develop critical analytic
abilities because of the poor quality of basic instruction and of
instruction in bi-lingual and English as a Second Language (ESL)
instruction . . . .263

The plaintiffs add that ELLs “fail to properly develop their English
language skills to a level necessary for them to read and converse in the
English language and . . . vote with full knowledge of relevant political
issues and . . . function effectively as civic participants.”264
Two aspects of the ELL framing deserve mention. First, although
ELL is not formally a race-specific category (that is, it is not expressly
limited to Latinxs), the category is not race-less. To begin, the plaintiffs
note seventy-five percent of ELLs are Latinx.265 Moreover, English has
long been conceptually tethered to whiteness and weaponized as a tool
of racial subordination—particularly, though not solely, vis-à-vis
Latinxs.266 In other words, the category ELL—whatever its formal
definition—is likely understood in racial terms.
Second, the plaintiffs characterize English literacy as a prerequisite
for civic participation and, by extension, position ELLs as unable to
engage in core democratic functions. One could dispute the accuracy of
this claim.267 But even if one accepts the claim’s descriptive accuracy,
one could still critique the frame. Here, the plaintiffs suggest that ELLs
are unable to participate effectively in American democracy because
they lack English proficiency. In other words, the plaintiffs employ a
standard deficit frame linked to an internal causal theory of inequality.
Consider an alternative frame. Rather than emphasize the ELLs’
lack of English proficiency, the plaintiffs could have highlighted
systemic design flaws—e.g., ways that community governance renders
sites of civic engagement inaccessible to non-English speakers.268 This

Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
265 Id.
266 See LAURA E. GÓMEZ, INVENTING LATINOS: A NEW STORY OF AMERICAN RACISM 112–16
(2020) (describing English-only movements designed to subordinate Mexican-Americans and
other Latinx communities).
267 Non-English speakers participate in a broad range of civic endeavors across the country.
One of many examples is Union de Vecinos, a Boyle Heights–based community organization led
by multiple individuals for whom Spanish remains a primary language. See Pea Nunez, Solo el
Pueblo Salva al Pueblo, YOUTUBE (June 2, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=EV5Z2OyBpYQ (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
268 One could analogize to debates that attribute inaccessible public spaces to a person’s
disability, as opposed to structural design choices that privilege able-bodied individuals. See
generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability Rights and the Discourse of Justice, 73 SMU L. REV. F.
26 (2020).
263
264
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alternative frame does not deny that English language skills matter. But
it pivots from a narrative of perceived minority deficits to structural or
institutional failures. As a result, this alternative framing is less likely to
reinforce notions of racialized inferiority (associated with certain nonEnglish languages) and more likely to invite structural remedies (that
focus on reforming deficient systems, not remedying deficient
individuals).
Given the availability of alternative frames, why did the plaintiffs
hew toward a deficit frame and internal theory of inequality? One
explanation is doctrine. As in Gary B., the A.C. plaintiffs had to prove
that their state deprived them a basic minimum education. This legal
hurdle, in turn, behooved the plaintiffs to trace civic engagement
problems to student shortcomings (the consequence of an inadequate
education), not a political ecosystem that excludes otherwise effective
and essential civic participants.
Through their briefing, the plaintiffs reinforced this deficit frame
by comparing the class members to “high-achieving” schools that
provide “their students an education sufficient to prepare them for
capable citizenship in accordance with the requirements of the
Constitution.”269 In other words, the plaintiffs juxtaposed class
members (who are framed as incapable citizens) with students from
better-resourced schools (who are framed as capable citizens). As with
the class profile, these comparisons are racially embodied, even if
facially race neutral. The plaintiffs noted, for example, that one of the
“high-achieving” schools is over ninety-five percent white.270
As I note throughout, I do not fault the plaintiffs for identifying
and challenging sites of racial inequality. My concern, rather, is that the
plaintiffs employ racial frames that risk reinforcing the social forces that
create that inequality in the first place. Consider, for example, how the
race-laden comparison of “good schools” and “bad schools” could
entrench anti-Black bias. For many Americans, (a) the prototypical
poor and undereducated student is Black; and (b) the prototypical Black

269 Class Action Complaint, supra note 245, at 37 (emphasis added); see also Plaintiffs’
Memorandum, supra note 244, at 33 (“[S]tudents attending schools in . . . affluent Rhode Island
school districts are being provided an education that is preparing them well for civic
participation, in stark contrast to the inadequate civic preparation that the individual plaintiffs
and class they represent are receiving.”).
270 Class Action Complaint, supra note 245, at 38 (“North Kingstown High School in the
affluent North Kingstown school district provides their 1400 students, only 1% of whom are
African American and 3% of whom are Latino, meaningful opportunities for an education that
prepares them to function productively as civic participants.”).
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student is poor and undereducated.271 This contrasts with (a) the
prototypical middle-class and well-educated student, who is viewed as
white; and (b) the prototypical white student, who is viewed as middle
class and well educated. The plaintiffs’ own narrative tracks this story—
but it further suggests that some (that is, white students) are capable
citizens and others (that is, Black students) are not. In other words, by
juxtaposing white wealth and privilege against Black and brown poverty
and underachievement, the plaintiffs reinforce dominant racialized
narratives about who has, and who lacks, academic competence—not
to mention the capacity for self-governance.272
Notably, the plaintiffs’ narrative strays from their own data. For
example, by emphasizing racial disparities, the plaintiffs obscure the
large numbers of white Rhode Island students who underachieve—per
plaintiffs’ own metrics.273 The plaintiffs, in turn, flatten Black and
brown students to the educational shortcomings of some while
decoupling academic underachievement and whiteness—even though
significant numbers of Rhode Island’s white students academically
underperform.274 In other words, the plaintiffs’ well-intended narrative
betrays aspects of the data and reifies pervasive racialized presumptions
about intellectual ability.275

271 Cf. Maria Krysan, Reynolds Farley & Mick P. Couper, In the Eye of the Beholder: Racial
Beliefs and Residential Segregation, 5 DU BOIS REV. 5, 19 (2008) (“Many Whites in racially divided
metropolises, such as Chicago and Detroit, have, we presume, an image of Black neighborhoods
as problem areas with lower-cost homes, poorly performing schools, and considerable risks of
being robbed or assaulted. Perhaps unconsciously, Whites borrow from their perceptions of what
they think a typical African American area is and negatively rank a neighborhood shown in a
video when they see Blacks on the block.”).
272 See Feingold & Carter, supra note 73, at 1707–08 (discussing how racial stereotypes and
cognitive heuristics reinforce racialized presumptions of academic incompetence).
273 See, e.g., supra notes 258–59, 262 and accompanying text.
274 Cf. Carbado, Turetsky & Purdie-Vaughns, supra note 70, at 177 (“Whites, on the other
hand, largely escape the mismatch critique. . . . The assumption seems to be that, unlike African
American beneficiaries of affirmative action, white working-class beneficiaries will not be in over
their head.”).
275 Moreover, the image of disengaged students contrasts with the students involved with A.C.
As detailed in a Boston Globe article and captured in a conversation with Trevor Noah, the lawsuit
energized and inspired students. See Allie Reed, 14 Students Sued Rhode Island over Civics
Education. Now, They’re More Politically Engaged than Ever, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 11, 2020, 1:49
PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/11/11/metro/14-students-sued-ri-over-civicseducation-now-theyre-more-politically-engaged-than-ever [https://perma.cc/5G52-6LL7] (“‘I
am part of the change that I want to see,’ Sok said. ‘I hope that the state of education improves,
and that everyone has the same opportunities.’ The dismissal of their case [is] not the end of the
road for the plaintiffs, they said. . . . ’‘We’re not giving up anytime soon,’ Sok said. ‘Everyone is
still fighting.’”); The Daily Show with Trevor Noah (Comedy Central television broadcast June
25, 2019).
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Even if one accepts that deficit frames can produce unintended
consequences, a key question emerges: In the ecosystem that is public
discourse, could narratives arising out of civil rights litigation actually
produce backlash, facilitate misdiagnoses, or otherwise compromise
projects of racial justice? In other words, is there actual cause for
concern? The short answer, to which I now turn, is yes.
C.

Why It Matters: Race Making Through Racial Storytelling

Decades of research reveal the prevalence of racial biases and their
influence over human judgment and decision-making.276 In recent
years, lay and academic audiences have shown growing interest in the
causal link between racial biases (implicit biases, in particular) and
racial inequality. Comparably less attention has been paid to the source
of racial biases. Below, I locate civil rights litigation as one potential
source.
Broadly speaking, racial biases arise from direct and vicarious
experiences with individuals from racial groups.277 Direct experiences
involve “actual experiences with people of other races” that are
unmediated “by a third party such as the mass media.”278 Vicarious
experiences, in contrast, refer to “imagined experiences—both fictional
and nonfictional—that are mediated through stories told by parents,
teachers, friends, and increasingly by the electronic mass media.”279
The United States remains a hypersegregated society. As a result,
most people in this country—whites in particular—lack meaningful

276 See Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, supra note 128, at 11 (“In general, social attitudes and
expectancies can exert many noteworthy effects on what people perceive and how they perceive
it.”); Jonathan P. Feingold, Equal Protection Design Defects, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 513, 532 (2019)
(“[H]umans possess systemic and pervasive biases—often in the form of attitudes and
stereotypes—about social categories like race, gender, and age.”); Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent
and Impact: Some Behavioral Realism About Equal Protection, 66 ALA. L. REV. 627, 629–33 (2015)
(discussing competing meta-analyses of implicit bias).
277 See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1166 (2000) (“From youth, we infuse
racial categories with meanings based on ‘experiences’ with people mapped to these [racial]
categories.”); Ramasubramanian, supra note 124, at 103 (“Media messages, along with numerous
other factors such as family and friends, play a crucial role in forming and maintaining social
stereotypes.”). Racial categories are themselves socially constructed—in that they do not preexist
the cultures within which they arise. See Kang, supra, at 1146–47 (describing racial category as
one component of the “social construction” of race).
278 Kang, supra note 277, at 1166–67.
279 Id. at 1166.
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direct contact with racial out-groups.280 This backdrop means vicarious
experiences play an outsized role in forming, circulating, and
entrenching racial biases.281 In practice, popular culture—a principal
driver of vicarious experiences—comprises the primary medium
through which most white Americans interact with, and “learn” about,
communities of color.282 In other words, traditional mass media, local
news, and social media constitute potent conduits of racial biases.283
It should be no surprise, therefore, that dominant cultural
narratives—including racial stereotypes and theories of inequality—
produce, and are produced by, the racialized content and imagery
embedded across media platforms.284 Given the inextricable link that
binds public discourse, racial biases, and contemporary inequities,285
activists on the Left have rightly criticized the mainstream media and
political Right for trafficking in racialized caricatures.286 Yet, as outlined
above,287 the Left also often employs reductive narratives. These include

280 See Michelle Wilde Anderson & Victoria C. Plaut, Property Law: Implicit Bias and the
Resilience of Spatial Colorlines, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 25, 26–27 (Justin D.
Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (discussing hypersegregation); SCHNEIDER, CAREY,
PIAZZA & WHITE, supra note 160, at 4 (identifying hypersegregation across Massachusetts’s
public K–12 schools); Sugrue, supra note 202, at 265 (“[F]ew Americans of different racial and
ethnic backgrounds interact in a meaningful way on a daily basis.”).
281 See Feingold & Carter, supra note 73, at 1706 (“[S]tereotypes, particularly as they operate
across social groups, are often the product of vicarious experiences—that is, ‘simulated
engagements with racial others provided through various forms of the media or narrated by
parents and our peers.’” (footnote omitted)).
282 See ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:
MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 49 (2000).
283 See Ramasubramanian, supra note 124, at 103–07 (arguing that portrayals of race on
television can produce or reinforce biased perceptions about racialized groups and shape theories
that explain the subordinate status of certain racialized groups).
284 See Kang & Lane, supra note 148, at 515 (“Indeed, recent findings have provided further
evidence that television can be seen as transmitting something like Trojan horse viruses that
exacerbate implicit biases against racial minorities.”).
285 See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1553–54 (2005)
(analogizing local news media to Trojan horse computer viruses that covertly infect viewers with
implicit racial biases); see also Shanto Iyengar, Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The
Case of Poverty, 12 POL. BEHAV. 19, 21 (1990).
286 See, e.g., RACHEL D. GODSIL, BENJAMIN F. GONZALEZ & EMILY BALCETIS, PERCEPTION
INST., FINAL EVALUATION OF HALAL IN THE FAMILY: MEASURING EFFECTS ON IMPLICIT AND
EXPLICIT ANTI-MUSLIM BIAS 7 (2015) (“[P]opular culture has tended to underrepresent,
marginalize, and make caricatures of members of different racial and ethnic groups, who tend to
be depicted within several formulaic tropes rather than as fully developed, unique characters.”
(citation omitted)); Press Release, Color of Change, Civil Rights Group Demands that Fox Drop
Cops After 25 Years of Exploiting Negative Racial Stereotypes, https://colorofchange.org/press_
release/civil-rights-group-demands-fox-drop-cops-after-25 [https://perma.cc/LE2U-ATNN].
287 See supra Section I.B.
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deficit frames that flatten group identity by foregrounding and
emphasizing what a community is perceived to lack. The danger, as
noted throughout, is that these racial frames—even if deployed in the
name of equality—will entrench the same narratives deployed to
legitimate inequality.
Yet, even if one accepts that deficit frames present this precise risk,
one might still question the relative impact of deficit frames deployed in
the context of civil rights litigation. This is an important question. Given
the volume of racial discourse that populates popular culture, and the
biases already embedded therein, is there reason to believe that deficit
frames deployed in the context of litigation move the needle? And, even
if they do, might the benefits outweigh the costs?
As for the latter question, the short answer is that litigation and
strategic racial discourse need not exist as “either/or” propositions. This
answer invites us to reframe the question: How can litigants avoid—or
at least mitigate—deficit framing in the context of civil rights litigation?
I explore this question in earnest in Part IV. But first, to conclude Part
III, I offer three reasons why stakeholders ought to avoid deficit
framing—even in civil rights litigation.
1.

Unidentified Alternatives

Even if precise measurements are elusive, civil rights litigation
generates a small fraction of the racial discourse in our information
ecosystem. One might, accordingly, presume that deficit frames
deployed during litigation have little impact on existing racial biases
and dominant theories of inequality. Even accepting the above, it can
be easy to understate the impact of deficit framing.
Specifically, to effectively gauge impact, one must identify the
proper counterfactual. To some, the choice might appear as follows:
(a) civil rights litigation with deficit frames or (b) civil rights litigation
without deficit frames (or, for that matter, no civil rights litigation).
This is not, however, the only possible counterfactual—nor, would
I argue, the appropriate one. The question need not be whether to
discuss racial inequality (or whether to engage in civil rights litigation).
Rather, the question ought to be how to discuss racial inequality (or how
to engage in civil rights litigation).
Having reframed the question, an alternative inquiry emerges as
follows: (a) civil rights litigation with deficit frames or (b) civil rights
litigation with asset frames (or another form of racial discourse that
disrupts dominant racial narratives). The original formulation treats
the potential impact of deficit framing as a matter of subtraction—that
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is, the effect of removing deficit frames from the status quo. Here, in
contrast, impact turns on subtraction and addition—that is, replacing
deficit frames with counterframes that challenge the status quo.
Understood in this way, civil rights litigation transforms from a site of
discursive risk (due to deficit frames) to a site of discursive resistance.
That change, even if impossible to quantify, surely matters.
2.

Audience Matters

Another relevant variable is audience. We would not expect
school-financing litigation, and the narratives emanating therefrom, to
have an equal impact on all members of society. Just as high-volume
television viewers are most affected by racial representations embedded
in local news,288 individuals interested in school-financing litigation are
likely most affected by this information source. This would include
educators, a category I employ to capture teachers, administrators, and
other relevant stakeholders. Yet, unlike most high-volume television
viewers (who lack a direct ability to influence national or local policies),
educators enjoy a unique ability to impact—for better or worse—racial
equality across educational settings.289
To appreciate this dynamic, consider the following hypothetical.
Imagine a prototypical historically white-serving university. The
institution boasts a cohort of dedicated and well-meaning teachers,
administrative staff, and senior leaders. Nonetheless, it experiences a
period of intense student protest. Following a semester of unrest, the
university appoints a committee with two mandates: (1) identify sites of
racial inequality within the school and (2) prescribe responsive
remedies.
Just as the committee gets underway, national attention turns to
two high-profile school-financing lawsuits—which I will respectively
call “Case A” and “Case B.” Half of the task force happens to follow Case
A; the other half follows Case B. Among other similarities, both lawsuits
288 DIXON, supra note 146, at 51 (“In general, news and opinion consumers would come to
see a false world populated with Black family dysfunction, poverty, welfare dependence, criminal
behavior and absentee fathers.”).
289 Jordan G. Starck, Travis Riddle, Stacey Sinclair & Natasha Warikoo, Teachers Are People
Too: Examining the Racial Bias of Teachers Compared to Other American Adults, 49 EDUC.
RESEARCHER 273, 273–74 (2020). In a 2020 survey, over thirty percent of responding teachers
indicated the belief that Black parents value education less than white parents. Holly Kurtz,
Educators Support Black Lives Matter, but Still Want Police in Schools, Survey Shows, EDUC.
WEEK (June 25, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/leadership/educators-support-black-livesmatter-but-still-want-police-in-schools-survey-shows/2020/06 [https://perma.cc/739U-8D9G].
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include adequacy challenges and feature students of color from lowincome communities. But the cases diverge in one key respect. Whereas
the Case A plaintiffs employ a deficit frame that emphasizes student
underachievement and plight, the Case B litigants employ an asset
frame that portrays a resilient community of students who achieve more
with less.
It is not difficult to see how the competing frames might shape how
committee members view racial inequality at their own school.
Moreover, the lawsuits do not exist in a cultural vacuum. To the
contrary, they arise against a societal backdrop marked by pervasive
racialized expectations regarding who belongs at, who is expected to
succeed in, and who is presumptively unqualified to attend institutions
of higher education.290 Case A tracks and reinforces these expectations.
As a result, committee members who follow Case A are more likely to
(a) expect that Black and brown students will be underrepresented in
their university; (b) expect racial achievement gaps at the university;
and (c) attribute any underrepresentation and/or achievement gaps to
minority deficiencies (e.g., a perceived lack of training, preparation, or
“merit”).291 From these conclusions, the committee members are more
likely to view individual-level remedial programming (e.g., skills-based
training) as the best way to reduce perceived achievement gaps.292
In contrast, consider how the other committee members approach
their task. Informed by the racial frame that animated Case B, these
committee members are less likely to embrace racial narratives that
presume Black or brown academic incompetence.293 The alternative
frame, in turn, can shift expectations about, and interpretations of, any
observed racial disparities. Rather than attribute disparate outcomes to
student shortcomings, committee members may be quicker to ask
whether environmental forces—e.g., fraught measures of merit,
disparate treatment, or institutional culture—lock out or unevenly

290 See Feingold & Carter, supra note 73, at 1707–08 (introducing concept of “elite student
paradigm” to outline and unpack how racial stereotypes and cognitive heuristics interact to
produce racial lay theories that “render[] black students perpetual outsiders to the elite
institution”).
291 Any observed evidence of inequality is likely to reinforce preexisting racial narratives that
assume minority deficiencies and institutional neutrality.
292 Cf. Okonofua, Walton & Eberhardt, supra note 155, at 385 (“Like teachers, Black students
are exposed to negative stereotypes that impugn the intellectual ability of their group and that
label them as out of control, violent, or dangerous.”).
293 See generally PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR
WOMEN IN ACADEMIA (Gabriella Gutiérrez y Muhs, Yolanda Flores Niemann, Carmen G.
González & Angela P. Harris eds., 2012) (compilation of essays capturing the experience of
female academics of color).
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burden otherwise talented and motivated students from negatively
stereotyped racial groups.
My point is not that institutional deficiencies explain all racial gaps
all the time. But all too often, educational institutions fail to consider
how environmental forces often compromise the basic goal of an equal
learning environment.294 Accordingly, when institutions presume
student deficits and overlook institutional shortcomings, they invite a
vicious feedback loop: (a) unequal learning environments produce, or
exacerbate, achievement gaps that (b) reinforce racialized presumptions
of belonging and competence, while (c) insulating the institution from
meaningful critique.295
3.

Litigation Shapes Social Meaning

There is at least one additional reason to take seriously the
potential impact of deficit frames that arise in civil rights litigation. Civil
rights lawyering can shape dominant “social meanings”296 that structure
how individuals, institutions, and society understand the underlying
project of racial justice. With respect to school-financing doctrine, one
could argue that the Supreme Court has erected a doctrinal regime that
pushes litigants—and, by extension, the broader public—to think about
educational justice in terms of racial-minority deficits.
To appreciate this dynamic, it may help to explore other doctrinal
sites within the Supreme Court’s education and equality jurisprudence.
First, consider Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,297 in
which Justice Powell constitutionally tethered affirmative action to
student-body diversity.298 Prior to Bakke, affirmative action was widely
viewed as a tool to remedy Jim Crow—that is, a necessary, if
insufficient, tool to overcome the vestiges of legalized racial exclusion

294 Cf. Rosalee A. Clawson & Rakuya Trice, Poverty as We Know It: Media Portrayals of the
Poor, 64 PUB. OP. Q. 53, 61 (2000) (“Thus, if attitudes on poverty-related issues are driven by
inaccurate and stereotypical portrayals of the poor, then the policies favored by the public (and
political elites) may not adequately address the true problems of poverty.”).
295 Cf. Stacy Hawkins, Reverse Integration: Centering HBCUs in the Fight for Educational
Equality, 24 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 351 (2021) (comparing overwhelming success of HBCUs
in successfully training and educating Black students to consistent failure of predominately white
institutions).
296 See Asad Rahim, Diversity to Deradicalize, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1483 (2020).
297 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
298 Professor Asad Rahim characterizes Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion as “the quintessential
example of the power of legal doctrine to change public discourse and institutional logic.” Rahim,
supra note 296, at 1483.
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and subordination.299 Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion changed
everything.
With limited exception,300 Justice Powell embraced student-body
diversity as the sole interest that could justify race-conscious
admissions.301 According to Professor Asad Rahim, this pivot “severed
racial inclusion from the goal of remediation and the hope of
equality.”302 The impact was swift, seismic, and enduring. Rahim
explains that Powell’s turn to diversity “helped to fundamentally
reshape our society’s understanding of the proper aims of affirmative
action and, arguably, racial integration more generally.”303 The
consequences transcend university admissions plans. From classrooms
to boardrooms to presidential cabinets,304 “diversity” has become a
hegemonic—if often nebulous—concept through which Americans
approach and frame questions of racial equality and inclusion.305
Diversity, albeit perpetually underdefined, has become the
dominant frame through which we think about racial inclusion.306 The
consequences transcend semantics and terminology. When individuals
or institutions view affirmative action through the lens of diversity,
normative commitments can be reduced to a question of proportional
representation. Lost, in turn, is a commitment to interrogate
institutional arrangements that reproduce accumulated race and class
privilege. Racial disparities, when present, are viewed as the unfortunate
299 See id. at 1483–84. To be sure, racial justice was never the sole motivation behind
affirmative action. But, unlike today, affirmative action was conceptually linked to a societal
project of desegregation animated by demands for racial equality.
300 Justice Powell did not foreclose the possibility that a university could, consistent with the
Constitution, employ race-conscious admissions to remedy its own discrimination. See Bakke,
438 U.S. at 307 (“The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination.”). Moreover, Justice
Powell noted that race-conscious admissions would confer “no ‘preference’ at all” if employed to
correct a racial bias in student assessment. See id. at 306 n.43 (“To the extent that race and ethnic
background were considered only to the extent of curing established inaccuracies in predicting
academic performance, it might be argued that there is no ‘preference’ at all.”).
301 See Rahim, supra note 296, at 1425–26.
302 Id. at 1483.
303 Id.
304 See, e.g., Ally Mutnick & Laura Barrón-López, New DCCC Chair Draws Diversity Warning
from Colleagues as He Names Top Staffer, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2020, 5:32 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/22/new-dccc-chair-diversity-warning-top-staffer449803 [https://perma.cc/4Q2A-QUBV].
305 See Feingold, supra note 79, at 14 (“Institutions often seek ‘diversity’ without first having
done the work to define, precisely, why they want diversity, or to identify, concretely, what sorts
of diversity will get them there.”).
306 See ELLEN BERREY, THE ENIGMA OF DIVERSITY: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE AND THE LIMITS
OF RACIAL JUSTICE 6–9 (2015).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3997957

FEINGOLD.43.5.2 (Do Not Delete)

1912

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

6/30/22 1:14 PM

[Vol. 43:5

consequence of neutral market forces and selection processes that
formally attend to race are maligned as “racial preferences.”307 In short,
Justice Powell triggered a nationwide turn toward a conception of
diversity that decouples race from racism—a conceptual shift that
continues to constrain how we view affirmative action and antiracist
projects more broadly.308
Bakke is not the only example of civil rights litigation leading to
Supreme Court jurisprudence that shapes public discourse and
institutional logics on a matter of racial equality. Another example is
Brown v. Board of Education, which remains the Supreme Court’s most
celebrated decision. This praise often elevates the Brown Court’s
rejection of American apartheid. In certain respects, Brown deserves
praise for denouncing Jim Crow—a system the Court had explicitly
endorsed in Plessy v. Ferguson.
But, as others have cautioned, common celebration of Brown
overlooks how the Supreme Court (a) misdiagnosed segregation as the
source (as opposed to as symptom) of white supremacy and (b) reified
racial hierarchy in the United States. As one example, Brown and its
animating rationale identified integration as the proper remedy for the
racial harm of segregation.309 In the abstract, this makes sense and
hardly appears objectionable. But, in practice (and public imagination),
calls for integration often carried a presumptive preference for
whiteness (and white schools) over blackness (and Black schools).310
Moreover, the turn to integration came at the expense of alternative
remedial visions—e.g., an emphasis on equal resources (for Black
schools) over inclusion (in white schools).311
307 See Jonathan P. Feingold, SFFA v. Harvard: How Affirmative Action Myths Mask White
Bonus, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 707, 709–10, 734 (2019).
308 See Feingold, supra note 79, at 15 (“Justice Powell divorced diversity from the anti-racist
projects that only decades earlier had fueled the dismantling of state-sanctioned exclusion and
subordination across sectors of American life.”).
309 This is reflected, for instance, in Brown II, when the Supreme Court reiterated that racial
integration (into white schools) was the proper remedy for racial exclusion (from white schools).
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (directing district courts to take
actions “necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis
with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases”).
310 See Isaac Unah & Catherine M. Blalock, The Twilight of Brown: Empirical Analysis of
Resegregation and Voluntary Adoption of School Integration Policies Across the United States, 30
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 229–30 (2020).
311 See Derrick A. Bell, Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS
DECISION 185, 187 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 1st paperback ed. 2002) (“In their determination to strike
down state-mandated segregation, the petitioners [in Brown] ignore the admonishment of W. E.
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This logic bore material and symbolic consequences.312 To begin,
the one-directional (that is, Black to white) current of integration,
alongside anti-Black racism, decimated vibrant Black educational
communities and educators.313 Moreover, by any measure, integration
is a failed project. Notwithstanding a period of meaningful gains,
schools are as segregated as ever, and race and class remain strong
predictors of school quality.314
Symbolically, by embracing a one-directional model of
desegregation, Brown reified the common-sense notion that white
schools (and white teachers and white students) are superior to Black
schools (and Black teachers and Black students). This history, and the
narratives it reinforced, remain lodged in our cultural fabric. Nearly
seventy years after Brown, white Americans continue to prefer whiter
schools and whiter neighborhoods—even when presented with
objectively indistinguishable alternatives.315
Ultimately, Bakke and Brown are imperfect analogies for the
school-financing doctrine that governs contemporary adequacy
challenges. Nonetheless, these cases reveal how civil rights litigation and
the law it produces can shape how we think about, talk about, and seek
to remedy racial inequality in the United States. In Bakke, Justice Powell
catalyzed a turn to diversity (and away from racial justice) that
continues to influence public discourse and consciousness on matters
of racial inclusion and representation. In Brown, the Supreme Court
conflated access to white space with racial justice. This integrationist
vision of racial justice, and the implicit racial hierarchy on which it rests,

B. DuBois . . . . ‘Negro children need neither segregated schools nor mixed schools. What they
need is education.’”); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 341, 343–46 (1975).
312 Racialized power over spatial territory propels (a) the racialized misallocation of resources
and (b) the production of racial meaning. Cf. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL:
THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 1–2 (1st papercover ed. 2008) (disaggregating concept
of racial “stratification” into material (e.g., income or wealth) and symbolic (e.g., prestige or
social standing) dimensions).
313 See James E. Haney, The Effects of the Brown Decision on Black Educators, 47 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 88, 90 (1978) (“In North Carolina, 128 out of 131 white school superintendents believed
that it would be ‘impracticable to use Negro teachers’ in schools under their jurisdiction.”).
314 See Unah & Blalock, supra note 310, at 242, 244. One should be careful not to overstate the
overlap between race and class. In the United States, residential segregation is more likely to track
race than it does class. See Farley, Steeh, Krysan, Jackson & Reeves, supra note 160, at 751 (“If
residential segregation were a matter of income, rich blacks would live with rich whites and poor
blacks with poor whites. This does not happen.”).
315 See, e.g., Krysan, Farley & Couper, supra note 271, at 18–20; Courtney M. Bonam, Hilary
B. Bergsieker & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Polluting Black Space, 145 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 1561,
1561–63 (2016).
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continues to shape dominant conceptions of educational equality in
America.
It may be that school-financing doctrine never attains the cultural
resonance or impact of a Brown or Bakke. Nonetheless, prevailing
doctrine pushes litigants—and by extension, the public—to think about
educational justice in terms of student deficits, a frame that is neither
inevitable nor most conducive to realizing a fairer and more equal
educational landscape. For advocates, this backdrop poses a question:
How can stakeholders avoid problematic racial frames without giving
up school-financing litigation? In the next and final Part, I offer some
provisional thinking on a way out of this civil rights catch-22.
IV. A WAY OUT?
Framing matters. That much is clear. And racial frames that
emphasize community deficits appear prone to hinder short- and longterm projects of racial reform—even when mobilized in the context of
civil rights litigation. What, then, are we to do? Given the unintended
consequences that can follow even successful litigation, how should
communities, attorneys, and students balance the potential benefits and
risks of litigation?
Below, I offer provisional thoughts on one way forward. Here, I
focus on litigants’ autonomy to determine how they frame racial
inequality—even under doctrinal constraints. To be clear, my focus on
litigant behavior (per the racial stories they tell) should not be viewed
as the fix to the catch-22 outlined herein. A more comprehensive and
structural response would also center Supreme Court jurisprudence—
the source of our catch-22—and consider how doctrinal changes might
mitigate the bind plaintiffs and their attorneys face.
Nonetheless, I focus on litigants for two primary reasons: First,
nothing precludes civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys from
mobilizing alternative racial frames. Constraints will always exist—
whether they be doctrinal or simply competing visions among
stakeholders. But, as I discuss below, doctrine is not determinative—
particularly when it comes to public-facing communications that need
not satisfy discrete legal elements.
Second, there are examples of successful litigation in which
plaintiffs highlight racial inequality without reverting to deficit frames.
One example from the domain of education, to which I now turn, is
Smith v. Regents of the University of California. Smith is noteworthy
because the plaintiffs employed a racial narrative that juxtaposed
student talent, resilience, and potential against a backdrop of biased
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tests and institutional deficiencies. For multiple reasons, the underlying
claims in Smith rendered doctrine less restrictive than would be the case
in adequacy challenges like Gary B. or A.C. Nonetheless, Smith offers
one route to reframing racial inequality.
A.

Smith v. Regents

In 2019, a coalition of students and organizations sued the
University of California Regents (UC) for using the SAT and ACT
within its admissions process.316 The plaintiffs self-identify as “students
and organizations that are committed to college access for
underrepresented minority students and students with disabilities.”317
Given A.C. and Gary B., one might expect the Smith plaintiffs to
emphasize the students’ underachievement and academic deficits. In
fact, the Smith plaintiffs do just the opposite—and in so doing, they
resist dominant narratives that portray Black and brown students as
unprepared for the rigors of higher education.318
From the complaint’s opening paragraphs, the Smith plaintiffs
center the students’ individual worth and merit. Their message is clear
and consistent: institutional failures and biased tests (that confer
unearned race and class preferences on wealthy and white students)
unfairly disadvantage talented and accomplished young people of
color.319 To the extent deficits exist in this story, they lie with the UC

316 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No.
RG19046222 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint].
317 Id. at 8.
318 See id. at 4 (“[T]he UC admissions process . . . creates formidable barriers to access to
public higher education for deserving students from low-income families, students from
historically underrepresented racial and ethnic groups, and students with disabilities.”); id. at 99
(“Defendants’ own data . . . shows the continued reliance on the SAT and ACT tests to be a
substantial factor in excluding these deserving Plaintiffs from their rightful college opportunities
and all the benefits that flow therefrom.” (emphasis added)).
319 See id. at 8 (“Student plaintiffs are four talented and accomplished young people whose
ability to access public higher education has been hindered by UC’s SAT or ACT score
requirement.”); id. at 6 (“UC psychometricians have found that up to 12 percent of items are
biased against Black students, and up to 10 percent of items are biased against Latinx students.”);
id. at 24 (“[W]hereas students with inflated scores were ‘disproportionately male, affluent, white
or Asian, and with highly educated parents,’ students with scores that were markedly lower than
their high school grades would predict were ‘disproportionately female, black or Latin[x], lowincome, and first-generation.’” (second alteration in original)); id. at 26 (“In other words,
students’ socioeconomic characteristics—rather than their individual merit—predict almost 40
percent of the variation in their SAT and ACT scores.”); id. at 87 (“[T]he statewide admissions
index . . . provides a wealth and race bonus to White and affluent students . . . .”).
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system and the tests it relies upon.320 The plaintiffs specifically critique
the SAT and ACT as “prox[ies] for students’ wealth and accumulated
advantage.”321 UC’s use of such tests, in turn, corrupts even the pretense
of meritocracy by “systematically and unlawfully den[ying] talented
and qualified students with less accumulated advantage a fair
opportunity to pursue higher education at the UC.”322

Returning to our racial inequality frames, Smith represents our
first encounter with a narrative that falls in the upper-right quadrant—
that is, a narrative that emphasizes student assets and attributes unequal
outcomes to external forces (e.g., institutional deficiencies). Smith
offers a useful reference point, in part, because the plaintiffs neither
elide nor diminish how race shapes institutional access. To the contrary,
the plaintiffs center race within their analysis and critique. Nonetheless,
they flip a common script. Whereas dominant narratives present
damaged and deficient students, the plaintiffs portray a broken
320 See id. at 24 (“[T]he College Board itself has demonstrated that the SAT treats students
with less accumulated advantage unfairly.”).
321 Id. at 25.
322 Id. at 4; see also id. at 3 (“[The] SAT and ACT . . . are demonstrably discriminatory against
the State’s least privileged students . . . .”); id. at 3–4 (arguing that UC does not meet its
“obligation to provide equal access to all qualified students”); id. at 27 (“UC is knowingly using
a metric that weighs in favor of more affluent students relative to students with less accumulated
advantage.”).
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institution as the story’s chief antagonist. In this sense, the plaintiffs
contrast their assets with the university’s deficits.
Moreover, the plaintiffs do not ignore evidence—including
statistics—of racial inequality.323 Given the lawsuit’s aim, it would be
hard to imagine a complaint that omitted racial gaps in test
performance or admissions rates. One might wonder, accordingly,
whether exposure to the litigation—and, specifically, statistics of racial
inequality—could trigger the backlash discussed throughout. For
multiple reasons, the plaintiffs take measures that should mitigate that
risk.
First, the plaintiffs do not allow the facts to “speak for
themselves.”324 Recall that in the studies outlined above,325 evidence of
inequality was presented alone. As a result, participants were left to
draw their own conclusion—often leading to internal causal theories.
Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs complement the data with an explicit
causal story that explains, in express detail, the provenance and
relevance of any observed racial disparities. Specifically, the plaintiffs
trace racial disparities, both in test performance and admission rates, to
fraught exams and institutional reliance thereon—not to unmotivated,
unprepared, or incapable students. In so doing, the plaintiffs resist the
often unspoken but powerful presumption that disparities track actual
gaps in preparation and potential.326
Second, the plaintiffs decouple the related association that links
elite universities and whiteness.327 As one example, the plaintiffs indict
UC’s current admissions regime as “granting a wealth and race bonus
to affluent and White students.”328 This framing calls attention to
unearned race and class advantages that UC, through its admissions
process, extends to white and wealthy students. Relatedly, the plaintiffs
expose how reductive and unmindful presumptions about Asian

323 See id. at 6 (“The highly discriminatory nature of the SAT and ACT has resulted in starkly
disparate student outcomes. . . . [A]mong students taking the SAT in California, 45 percent of
White students scored 1200 or above, compared to only nine percent of Black students and 12
percent of Latinx students. Only one percent of Black students and two percent of Latinx students
scored in the top score bracket, compared to 12 percent of White students.” (footnote omitted)).
324 See Hetey & Eberhardt, Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves, supra note 20.
325 See supra Section II.A.
326 See Complaint, supra note 316, at 83–84 (faulting UC for relying on deficient tests that
“displace[] high-performing . . . underrepresented minority applicants from the top tiers of the
UC applicant pool”).
327 See Feingold & Carter, supra note 73, at 1707–09 (describing “elite student paradigm”
whereby white students are presumed to belong on elite university campuses).
328 Complaint, supra note 316, at 75.
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success mask meaningful differences across Asian ethnicities.329 In so
doing, the plaintiffs resist model-minority myths that, beyond
distorting the Asian American experience, attribute Black or brown
underperformance and underrepresentation to inferior cultural
values.330
Third, the racial disparities presented in Smith are subordinate to
other facts and a consistent narrative that foregrounds the plaintiffs’
noteworthy achievements and accolades. As a result, this evidence of
inequality—as a proxy for community deficits—is rendered less salient
than in Gary B. or A.C. The statistics, in turn, are less prone to activate
and reinforce racial stereotypes and related narratives that rationalize
the status quo.
In total, Smith offers a roadmap for litigants to discuss race and
racial inequality without inviting the pitfalls that follow deficit
frames.331 At the same time, context matters. Not all legal challenges will
be as inviting to the type of racial framing that animated Smith. That
said, Smith still offers a road map to guide racial discourse across civil
rights domains. Below, to conclude, I explore how the Gary B. and A.C.
plaintiffs might have reframed their disputes to better model the
emphasis on assets and institutional deficiencies that animates Smith.332

329 See id. at 85 (“Korean and Taiwanese applicants had acceptance rates of 19.18 percent and
18.40 percent, respectively, as compared to acceptance rates of 12.35 percent for Filipinx
applicants and 9.55 percent for Hmong applicants.”).
330 Racialized narratives that rationalize the underrepresentation of Black and brown students
are enmeshed in, and inseparable from, narratives that attribute the perceived overrepresentation
of Asian students to hard work and industriousness. See Vinay Harpalani, Asian Americans,
Racial Stereotypes, and Elite University Admissions, 102 B.U. L. REV. 233, 244 n.42 (2022) (“The
model minority stereotype has deep roots in U.S. history and has long been used to juxtapose
Asian Americans and Black Americans.”).
331 The racial discourse in Smith tracks recommendations from Professors Hetey and
Eberhardt. See Hetey & Eberhardt, Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves, supra note 20, at 185–
86; see also Phia Shante Salter, Representations of Black History as Intentional Worlds of
Oppression and Liberation 45 (Sept. 22, 2010) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas) (KU
ScholarWorks) (observing that support for antiracist policies increased when information
included historical representations that highlighted barriers); Iyengar, supra note 285, at 21–23
(observing that whether a newscast employed episodic framing or thematic framing affected
causal attributions for issues such as poverty and unemployment, which, in turn, shaped
intergroup attitudes and policy preferences).
332 I am not advancing the positive claim that the Gary B. and A.C. plaintiffs should have
reframed their disputes in the ways I discuss below. That question involves multiple
considerations that transcend this Article. My more modest goal is to outline alternative
narratives that could mitigate the dangers inherent in deficit frames.
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Reframing Gary B. and A.C.

Smith offers an imperfect model for reframing the racial discourse
that defined Gary B. and A.C. Among other differences, Smith did not
involve an adequacy challenge. The plaintiffs, accordingly, did not
confront the doctrinal hurdles present in Gary B. and A.C. Moreover,
Smith involved university admissions, a context distinct from the K–12
educational setting relevant to school-financing litigation. These
distinctions are real. But they should not be overstated. Smith remains
a useful model for re-imagining how one might recast stories of racial
inequality in the K–12 inadequate-funding context.
Above all, doctrine is relevant but not determinative. This is true,
in part, because judges (or juries) are never the sole audience a plaintiff
can address. Beyond courts, the public often comprises a distinct and
critical audience—particularly when litigation confronts a matter of
broad public concern. School-financing litigation, as with civil rights
litigation more broadly, falls into this category. And, unlike courts, the
public is far less concerned with a party’s ability to satisfy discrete legal
elements.333 To the contrary, doctrinal requirements that rightly
constrain arguments in the court of law are far less relevant when one
pivots to the court of public opinion.
One example of this maneuvering has occurred in Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President of Harvard College (SFFA), ongoing
litigation concerning Harvard’s race-conscious admissions policy. The
SFFA plaintiffs have advanced two distinct legal claims: (1) the claim
that Harvard intentionally discriminates against Asian applicants; and
(2) a more generic claim challenging the legality of Harvard’s
affirmative-action policy.334 As a matter of fact and law, these claims
exist independent of each other. It would be hard to know this, however,
based on the plaintiffs’ characterization of the case. Across their publicfacing communications (and, to a lesser extent, their legal briefing),
Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) has blurred any meaningful
distinction between their two claims. More specifically, SFFA has

333 I am not suggesting that parties can make inconsistent statements to courts and the public
without consequence. But as a matter of storytelling, litigants often employ different registers,
with different points of emphasis and inflection, when engaging different audiences. Moreover,
when speaking to the public, doctrine is far less relevant to how a party frames a given
controversy.
334 See Complaint at 101–18, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of
Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14-cv-14176). Counts II through VI
effectively challenge Harvard’s use of affirmative action. See id. at 104–18. Count I, in contrast,
alleges that Harvard intentionally discriminates against Asians. See id. at 101–04.
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constructed the narrative that affirmative action is the source of antiAsian bias—a portrayal that suggests Harvard’s admissions policy pits
Black and brown students against their Asian American counterparts.335
The foregoing frame is inconsistent with SFFA’s formal
allegations, which recognize that white applicants are the primary
beneficiaries of any anti-Asian bias.336 And yet, since the litigation’s
inception, the “affirmative action-as-culprit” framing has dominated
public perception of the case. From SFFA’s perspective, this is a win in
itself; it furthers SFFA’s broader objective to politically malign and
legally compromise the case for affirmative action—and race-conscious
remedies writ large. As I explain elsewhere, “[b]y positioning [Asian
Americans] as affirmative action’s victim[s], SFFA can weaken the
normative appeal and doctrinal security of an already fragile set of
policies.”337
SFFA offers several lessons. First, it is a reminder that legal
doctrine, even if relevant, does not dictate the racial narrative a plaintiff
employs. Second, SFFA’s communication strategy reveals how a party’s
public-facing discourse, when intentional, consistent, and sustained,
can shape public understanding about a case in ways that diverge from
the arguments written in a party’s legal brief. Third, and perhaps most
important, it is a reminder that meaningful civil rights reform, even if
mandated through the court of law, rarely occurs without
corresponding support in the court of public opinion. To this end,
litigation’s impact on public perception and public consciousness can
be as significant as the court ruling itself.
CONCLUSION
My goal has been to illuminate an underexamined predicament
facing civil rights litigants. As described throughout, certain doctrinal
regimes incentivize plaintiffs to emphasize community deficits that
track pervasive racial stereotypes and regressive theories of inequality.
Even if strategic in the context of litigation, racialized deficit frames can
harden many of the conditions that necessitate litigation in the first
place. As a result, even successful litigation can calcify structural forces
and individual behaviors that produce and sustain racial inequities
across educational domains.

335
336
337

See Feingold, supra note 307, at 709–10.
See id.
Id. at 718–19.
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By highlighting these risks, my intent is not to stifle litigation
strategies nor to question how local communities mobilize against an
unjust status quo. Nonetheless, it behooves litigants, their allies, and the
civil rights community to appreciate the potential for deficit framing to
hinder ambitious projects of antiracist reform.338 For those committed
to discussing racial inequality in ways most likely to facilitate such
efforts, Smith offers a provisional roadmap. Moreover, as noted above,
litigants are not the only actors implicated in this doctrinal bind.
Others, including judges and legislators, should consider reform when
civil rights doctrines drive racial discourse prone to compromise the
pursuit of racial justice.339
If nothing else, the catch-22 outlined herein should inform
ongoing debates about the benefits and limitations of civil rights
litigation. In all hopes, this Article offers a new point of entry into a
long-standing conversation.

338 See Bryan Adamson, “Thugs,” “Crooks,” and “Rebellious Negroes”: Racist and Racialized
Media Coverage of Michael Brown and the Ferguson Demonstrations, 32 HARV. J. ON RACIAL &
ETHNIC JUST. 189, 191–92 (2016).
339 Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Gains, Losses, and Judges: Framing and the
Judiciary, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 521, 541 (2018) (“Framing effects thus have significant
implications for the development of law.”).
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